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Purpose and Objectives 
Climate change, given its significant and transboundary physical effects and consequent 
impacts on societies, presents a significant challenge for global governance frameworks, 
including for the oceans. Climate change will continue to manifest through the 21st century 
regardless of international efforts, which is compelling states to consider not only how to slow 
climate change but also to manage its ecological and socio-political impacts.1 The developing 
“climate adaptation regime” is intended to manage climate change’s adverse impacts by reducing 
vulnerability and increasing resiliency. It is relevant not only to ecological systems but also to 
human systems, including law and policy frameworks like the international law of the sea.  
The law of the sea, meanwhile, is not a static, stand-alone governance framework, and it 
may evolve in tandem with international law. As climate change compels changes across 
institutions and governance systems, the purpose of this thesis is to explore how the law of the 
sea might accommodate developing climate law, particularly legal adaptation obligations. While 
a significant body of scholarship assesses climate change’s implications for the law of the sea, 
scholars have focused little attention on the legal significance of the adaptation regime.2 As such, 
this thesis seeks to address this gap by answering the following questions: 
• What is the legal significance of the climate adaptation regime to the law of the sea? 
o What is the legal content and nature of the climate adaptation regime?3 
o How might the law of the sea evolve in response to climate change and the climate 
adaptation regime?4 
o Where and how might the adaptation regime inform the interpretation and application 
of the law of the sea?5 
Terminology and Scope Delimitation 
This thesis focuses on two bodies of international law, requiring careful scope 
delimitation in deference to format requirements. It largely limits analysis of the law of the sea to 
 
1 See Levin, K., Waskow, D., & Gerholdt, R. (2021). 5 big findings from the IPCC's 2021 Climate Report. World Resources 
Institute. https://www.wri.org/insights/ipcc-climate-report. 
2 See Chapter I for a review of the relevant literature. 
3 Chapter II seeks to address this sub-question.  
4 Chapter III seeks to address this sub-question. 
5 Chapter IV seeks to address this sub-question. 
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the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), excluding analysis of other 
instruments except where relevant to the convention itself.6 This thesis also seeks to avoid 
relitigating the significant scholarship already devoted to individual climate change-related legal 
issues in the law of the sea. While it at times does refer to this scholarship, it generally seeks to 
address individual climate change-related issues and related scholarship only when viewed 
through the framework of the adaptation regime. Law of the sea scholars have not broadly 
discussed the adaptation regime, requiring this thesis to review and analyze its content and 
nature.7 This regime may be applicable beyond the law of the sea; however, this thesis limits 
analysis to only what is immediately relevant in an oceans context. Analysis of the adaptation 
regime that considers aspects not relevant to the law of the sea is thus generally beyond the scope 
of this thesis, particularly given the regime’s ongoing development.  
The terminology used in this thesis derives primarily from their definitions and usage in 
multilateral instruments. Given the overwhelming focus of this thesis on climate change and the 
adaptation regime, it is perhaps necessary to define some critical terms early. Chapter I discusses 
climate-related terminology at greater length, but the concept of climate change adaptation 
(“climate adaptation”) generally refers to efforts to manage climate change’s adverse effects on 
both ecological and human systems (including law frameworks) by reducing vulnerability and 
increasing resilience, largely to safeguard human security. The “adaptation regime” refers to the 
body of developing climate change law focused on supporting and promoting climate adaptation, 
while “climate action” refers to international efforts to respond to climate change (of which, 
adaptation is a component). “International community” refers to states invested in climate action. 
Content, Sources, and Methodology 
Given the complex nature of parallel developing regimes, one of which (climate 
adaptation) is relatively imprecisely defined, this thesis often relies on doctrinal research 
methods but also seeks to match methodology to research sub-questions as appropriate. Given 
that climate adaptation is a multi- and interdisciplinary endeavor, this thesis also includes 
interdisciplinary considerations. Chapter I contextualizes the importance of the climate change 
regime to oceans governance, exploring the nature and purpose of climate adaptation. In addition 
 
6 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (10 December 1982, in force 1994). 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
7 See Chapter I for review of the relevant literature. 
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to reviewing relevant scholarship, this involves socio-legal research considering climate change 
science, policy, and international relations issues. 
Chapter II employs traditional doctrinal methods in systematizing, clarifying, and 
evaluating the adaptation regime’s legal content and rules. It references authoritative texts and 
sources of international law indicated by Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, primarily focusing on international agreements like the United Nations Framework on 
Climate Change and the Paris Agreement.8 It also analyzes an array of other sources, including 
evolving international custom as indicated by nascent state practice, soft law instruments and 
documents such as decisions by the Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC and various 
UN bodies, relevant judicial decisions, and relevant works of the International Law Association 
(ILA), the International Law Commission (ILC), and legal scholars. It further analyzes the 
adaptation regime’s legal content and nature considering other internationally recognized 
principles and norms, such as international environmental principles and human rights. 
Chapter III analyzes the legal mechanisms by which the LOSC may develop in response 
to climate change and adaptation needs. Beyond descriptive legal analysis of LOSC evolutionary 
mechanisms, it employs limited socio-legal analysis considering international relations and 
policy issues with an eye de lege ferenda. It focuses on treaty interpretation as an evolutionary 
mechanism, however. In addressing the harmonization of two developing legal regimes, this 
thesis relies on systematic interpretation according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) and customary treaty interpretation rules indicated by the works of the ILC, 
case law, and legal scholarship.9 Presupposing a single system of international law, systematic 
interpretation considers treaties against the background of other international law. While such 
interpretation could overstep the intent of the original law, the LOSC was designed to consider 
future international law, and the adaptation regime is still developing, legalizing, and is designed 
to strengthen according to the progressive nature of climate change instruments.10 Chapter III 
also notes teleological considerations, but it avoids historical interpretation given the adaptation 
regime’s rapid development and climate change’s continuing manifestation. 
 
8 Statute of the International Court of Justice (18 April 1946; in force 24 October 1945), Art. 8. 
9 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (22 May 1969; in force 27 January 1980) (VCLT), UNTS 1155. 
10 For a full accounting of systematic and other interpretive methodologies, including criticisms of the methods, see Ammann, 
Odile. (2020). The Interpretative Methods of International Law: What Are They, and Why Use Them? In Domestic Courts and 
the Interpretation of International Law. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, pp. 191-222.; see also Padjen, Ivan L. (2020). Systematic 
Interpretation and the Re-systematization of Law: The Problem, Co-requisites, a Solution, Use. International Journal for the 
Semiotics of Law/Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique, 33(1), pp. 189-213. 
 4 
 Following the understanding developed in the previous part, Chapter IV analyzes how the 
adaptation regime may inform the systematic interpretation of parts of the LOSC. The intention 
of this chapter is not to systematically interpret every part of the LOSC in consideration of 
adaptation obligations but to generally illustrate the adaptation regime’s legal significance to the 
LOSC. It generally applies systematic interpretation considering adaptation obligations as a 
framework approach to settling climate change-related legal issues in the law of the sea, often 
relying on relevant legal scholarship to expound legal arguments and proposals compatible with 
this interpretive approach. Finally, this thesis concludes, according to the analysis of the prior 
chapters, with an assessment of the adaptation regime’s significance to the law of the sea.  
Chapter I. The Law of the Sea and Climate Change 
Climate Change and Coastal Impacts 
 Climate change is not only an environmental problem but an unpredictable and 
destabilizing challenge to human systems, including governance and legal frameworks. As Vidas 
et al. note, “The implicit assumption of relatively stable natural conditions, present through 
millennia and centuries (including most of the twentieth century), is built into foundations of the 
political and legal structures surrounding us today – but this is what will, already in the coming 
decades of this century, progressively lose its factual basis”.11 Collective adverse “climate 
impacts” can be unpredictable, socio-politically destabilizing, and dangerous to human 
security.12 Indeed, global oceanic governance systems are coming under increasing and 
significant stress from climate change. Indeed, the seas are expected to face some of climate 
change’s most significant environmental impacts. Rapid climatic shifts including ocean 
acidification threaten marine biodiversity, sending shockwaves through ecosystems and the food 
chain, with subsequent damage to fisheries. 13 Sea level rise is eroding coastlines, inundating 
critical ecosystems, facilitating saltwater infiltration of vital freshwater sources, and facilitating 
more dangerous storm surges from increasingly frequent and severe extreme weather.  
 
11 Vidas, D., Zalasiewicz, J., Williams, M., & Summerhayes, C. (2020). Climate Change and the Anthropocene: Implications for 
the Development of the Law of the Sea. In E. Johansen, S. Busch, & I. Jakobsen (Eds.), The Law of the Sea and Climate Change: 
Solutions and Constraints. Cambridge: Cambridge University, p. 36. 
12 For an overview of adverse socio-political impacts of climate change, see Brown, Oli (2008).  Migration and Climate Change, 
International Organization for Migration. IOM Migration Research Series, No. 31, pp. 9-42. 
13 For a general overview of climate impacts on the oceans, see Vidas et al. (2020), p. 36.; see also Redgwell, Catherine. (2019). 
Treaty Evolution, Adaptation and Change: Is the LOSC ‘Enough’ to Address Climate Change Impacts on the Marine 
Environment?, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 34(3), p. 442. 
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 These physical impacts entail adverse corresponding socio-economic and political effects 
on coastal communities and states. The combined effects of climate change pose an increasing 
threat to the existence of coastal communities, portending a daunting future crisis. More than 1.4 
people may live in low-lying coastal areas and more than 400 million could face extreme flood 
events by 2060.14 And even where societies withstand climate change’s impacts, they are 
unlikely to emerge unscathed as climate change threatens critical food resources, damages 
coastal livelihoods, and undermines critical marine ecosystem services such as nutrient recycling 
and natural flood defense. Developing countries, least responsible for climate change, will 
struggle with these effects, which are most dangerous to island nations. Sea level rise may 
submerge entire islands, and even where the territory loss is only partial, saltwater infiltration 
and extreme weather may render them uninhabitable, which threatens their legal existence as 
independent states.15 Exacerbating this problem, climate change will impact coastal fisheries 
providing island nations with critical sources of sustenance and economic activity.16  
 As climate change continuously manifests in increasingly adverse effects on the seas and 
coastal states, it is putting pressure on the LOS regime. The LOSC set forth a regime organizing 
the oceans into different maritime zones to address and regulate human oceanic activities. The 
LOSC, though creating a framework to address future ocean governance issues, did not 
anticipate climate change’s significant environmental shifts and thus does not necessarily 
provide clear solutions for the associated emergence of climate-related legal issues.17  
Climate Law and the Law of the Sea 
While the LOSC does not reference climate change, and its parties have not concluded 
any oceans-specific climate instruments or agreements, the international community has 
responded to climate change’s increasing environmental and societal threats. The core of this 
response is based on the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), along with the associated 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement, but it 
may arguably be considered its own field of law. Bodansky notes,  
 
14 Neumann B, Vafeidis AT, Zimmermann J, Nicholls RJ (2015) Future Coastal Population Growth and Exposure to Sea-Level 
Rise and Coastal Flooding—A Global Assessment. PLoS ONE 10(3). 
15 See Oral, Nilüfer. International Law as an Adaptation Measure to Sea-level Rise and Its Impacts on Islands and Offshore 
Features, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 34, 3 (2019), pp. 415–439 
16 Xue, Guifang. (2013). Climate Change Challenges and the Law of the Sea Responses. In Climate Change: International Law 
and Global Governance, p. 554. 
17 See Redgwell (2019), p. 446-448. 
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Although the UN climate regime forms the core of international climate change law, 
international climate change law, conceived more broadly, includes not only the UN regime, 
but also rules and principles of general international law relevant to climate change; norms 
developed by other treaty regimes and international bodies; regulations, policies, and 
institutions at the regional, national, and sub-national levels; and judicial decisions of 
national, regional, and international courts.18  
Climate change law, Peel et al. write, is a multi-level, multidisciplinary field drawing tools and 
perspectives from various legal fields (from property to human rights to environmental law) 
focused on mitigating and adapting to climate change.19  
The emergence of international law relating to climate change is a significant legal 
development. As Ruhl notes regarding environmental law, “Climate change will impose 
unyielding physical, biological, and social constraints on what is possible to achieve through 
environmental law, but it will also exert tremendous structural pressures on the very design and 
implementation of the law itself”.20 However, the full impact of this complex developing body of 
international law is not clear given the speed at which it emerged. As Calarne et al. emphasize, 
the international community rapidly identified a global issue, negotiated a framework treaty, 
developed domestic laws and regulations, and began to coordinate international efforts through 
complex legal and political agreements at every level of governance—all within 25 years.21  
Law scholarship focused on climate change has proliferated despite this rapid 
development, and within this broad corpus, some explores the intersection of international 
climate law and the law of the sea. As Klein notes, “The ‘entire legal system’ in which UNCLOS 
is located must now include the growth in laws, institutions, and activities addressing the issues 
associated with climate change and its impact on the marine environment”.22 While the LOSC 
provides little specific climate change-related guidance, and international climate instruments 
provide little ocean-specific guidance, the regimes are not entirely separate, and the ILA, ILC, 
 
18 Bodansky, D., Brunnée, J. & Rajamani, L., Introduction to International Climate Change Law (June 10, 2017). In International 
Climate Change Law (Oxford Univ Press 2017), pp. 10-11. 
19 See Peel, Jacqueline, Godden, Lee, & Keenan, Rodney J. (2012). Climate Change Law in an Era of Multi-Level Governance. 
Transnational Environmental Law, 1(2), pp. 245–280. 
20 Ruhl, J.B. (2010). Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law. Environmental Law 
(Portland, Ore.), 40(2), pp. 374-376. 
21  Carlarne, C. P., Gray, K. R., & Tarasofsky, R. (2016). The Emergence of International Climate Change Law in The Oxford 
Handbook of International Climate Change Law. Oxford University Press., p. 3. 
22 Klein, Natalie. (2020). Adapting UNCLOS dispute settlement to address climate change. In Research Handbook on Climate 
Change, Oceans and Coasts, p. 111.  
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and others have devoted attention to their relationship. A significant body of literature now 
assesses the impact of climate change on the law of the sea regime, including thorough 
examinations of the responsivity of the current regime to climate change and legal analyses of 
individual climate change-related issues.23 Law of the sea scholars have for instance devoted 
attention to climate change’s impacts on baselines24, the status and entitlement of offshore 
features25, stewardship of living resources and the environment26, and dispute settlement.27 
Further topics include the LOS regime’s general response to climate change28 and using the 
LOSC to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.29  
Adaptation as a Global Goal Critical to the Law of the Sea 
The global climate change response is divided into two primary areas of action: 
mitigation and adaptation.30 Mitigation is to limit the physical process of climate change, 
 
23 For a comprehensive review of scholarship assessing climate impacts on the law of the sea, see Abate, Randall S. 
2015. Climate Change Impacts on Ocean and Coastal Law: U.S. and International Perspectives. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2015, pp. 1-699. 
24 A comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this thesis, but see, for example: Schofield, Clive, & Freestone, David. (2019). 
Islands Awash Amidst Rising Seas: Sea Level Rise and Insular Status under the Law of the Sea. The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law, 34(3); Busch, Signe. V. (2020). Law of the Sea Responses to Sea-Level Rise and Threatened Maritime 
Entitlements: Applying an Exception Rule to Manage an Exceptional Situation in The Law of the Sea and Climate Change: 
Solutions and Constraints. Cambridge: Cambridge University, pp. 309-335; & Lathrop, C. G., Roach, J. A., & Rothwell, D. R. 
(2019). Baselines under the International Law of the Sea, Brill Research Perspectives in the Law of the Sea, 2(1-2), pp. 1-177. 
25 A comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this thesis, but see, for example: Rayfuse, Rosemary (2013). Sea Level Rise 
and Maritime Zones: Preserving the Maritime Entitlements of “Disappearing” States. In Threatened Island Nations: Legal 
Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate, pp. 167-192.; Oral (2019), pp. 415-439.; & Valente, Sofia, & Veloso-
Gomes, Fernando. (2020). Coastal climate adaptation in port-cities: adaptation deficits, barriers, and challenges ahead. Journal of 
Environmental Planning and Management, 63(3), pp. 389–414.   
26 A comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this thesis, but see, for example: Molenaar, Erik. (2020). Integrating Climate 
Change in International Fisheries Law. In The Law of the Sea and Climate Change: Solutions and Constraints, pp. 263-288.; 
Dahl, Irene. (2020). Adaptation of Aquaculture to Climate Change: The Relevance of Temporal International Framework from a 
Norwegian Perspective. In The Law of the Sea and Climate Change: Solutions and Constraints, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 289-308.; Boyle, Alan. (2019). Litigating Climate Change under Part XII of the LOSC. The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 34(3), pp. 458-481.; Jakobsen, Ingvild Ulrikke. (2020). Marine Protected Areas and Climate 
Change. In The Law of the Sea and Climate Change: Solutions and Constraints, pp. 234-262.; & Johansen, E. & Henriksen, T. 
(2020). Climate change and the Arctic: adapting to threats and opportunities in Arctic marine waters. In Research Handbook on 
Climate Change, Oceans and Coasts, pp. 239–258. 
27 A comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this thesis, but see, for example: Boyle (2019), pp. 458-481; Doelle, Meinhard. 
(2006). Climate Change and the Use of the Dispute Settlement Regime of the Law of the Sea Convention. Ocean Development 
and International Law, 37(3-4), pp. 319-337.; Scott, Karen N. (2017). Climate Change and the Oceans: Navigating Legal Orders. 
In Legal Order in the World’s Oceans, Vol. 21, pp. 124–150.; & Lee, Seokwoo, & Bautista, Lowell. (2018). Part XII of the 
UNCLOS and the Duty to Mitigate Against Climate Change: Making Out a Claim, Causation, and Related Issues. Ecology Law 
Quarterly, 45(1), pp 129-155. 
28 A comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this thesis, but see, for example: Redgwell (2019), pp. 440-457.; Jakobsen, I., 
Johansen, E., & Nickels, P. (2020). The Law of the Sea as Part of the Climate-Change Regime Complex. In The Law of the Sea 
and Climate Change: Solutions and Constraints, pp. 376-377, 382.; & Poto, Margherita P. (2020). The Law of the Sea and Its 
Institutions. In The Law of the Sea and Climate Change: Solutions and Constraints, pp. 354-373. 
29 A comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this thesis, but see, for example: Guifang. (2013), pp. 547-592; Jakobsen et al. 
(2020), pp. 374-385.; & Boyle (2019), pp. 458-481. 
30 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014. Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. 
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, p. 151. 
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principally by limiting greenhouse gas emissions. Notably, limiting climate change is to buy 
time—not to avert climate change entirely, which tacitly acknowledges climate change as to 
some degree inevitable. Greenhouse gas emissions released to date have made a significant 
climate change unavoidable; furthermore, there is a time delay between greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions and the corresponding stabilization of atmospheric conditions. As such, 
mitigation must be understood as an attempt to restrict temperature increases to allow human 
societies and ecosystems to avoid the most catastrophic of climate change impacts.  
Even if international mitigation efforts are wildly successful in restricting climate change 
to just 1.5°C from preindustrial levels, it will still entail severe negative consequences. For 
example, sea-level rise and coastal flooding may displace 53 million people, and oceanic shifts 
such as acidification may contribute to a 70-90 percent decline in coral reefs.31 Considering that 
the world might warm by as much as 4.4°C, these negative impacts would constitute relative 
success.32 Mitigation is critical to avoiding the worst climate outcomes, but climate change’s 
inevitability and increasing threat to human security necessitate adaptation of natural and human 
systems.33 Adaptation includes a wide swathe of actions and policies intended to strengthen 
resiliency or decrease vulnerability to climate change’s impacts. It includes not only physical 
measures like seawalls but also alterations of law and policy.34  
Despite the increasing significance of adaptation, legal scholars and policymakers have, 
for several reasons, historically focused on mitigation and largely failed to address the legal 
implications of climate change from the perspective of adaptation. This extends to law of the sea 
scholarship as well. Virtually no law of the sea scholarship focuses on the legal significance of 
climate adaptation, and where they do, it is in conjunction with mitigation, views adaptation as 
an environmental protection issue, or focuses on the issue from the perspective of sea-level 
rise.35 While law of the sea scholars have largely discounted or failed to address the implications 
of this second branch of global climate action, some scholars have touched on it in part.  
 
31 IPCC, 2018. Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global 
greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable 
development, and efforts to eradicate poverty. In Press. Table 3.5. 
32 Levin et al. (2021). 
33 See IPCC (2014), pp. 833-868 & 755-832. 
34 Paris Agreement, UNFCCC Conference of Parties (12 December 2015), UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, Art. 7(7) 
35 See Hall & Persson (2018), pp. 540–566; & Calarne et al. (2016), pp. 18-21.; & for additional and thorough literature 
assessments, see Ruhl (2010); & Hall, N., & Persson, Å. (2018). Global climate adaptation governance: Why is it not legally 
binding? European Journal of International Relations, 24(3), pp. 540–566. 
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Craig for instance has discussed the adaptation regime, including the LOSC’s role in 
facilitating mitigation and adaptation in line with international climate law; however, she 
generally focuses on ecological adaptation rather than the adaptation of human systems.36 
Johansen and Henriksen have emphasized the importance of adapting the LOS and Arctic legal 
regimes to climate change, focusing on adaptive governance approaches, but their analysis is 
similarly focused on environmental governance.37 Oral, co-chair of the ILC Study Group on sea-
level rise in relation to international law, has perhaps focused most on the significance of the 
adaptation regime to the LOS regime. She has analyzed the relevance of the adaptation regime 
under international climate law to marine protection measures, including regarding ocean 
acidification.38 Most notably, she has identified basic legal obligations related to climate 
adaptation and analyzed the state of climate law and the law of the sea concerning adaptation 
measures such as artificial island construction and coastal reinforcement. Though she argues that 
international law must itself adapt to facilitate adaptation to sea-level rise, her analysis focuses 
specifically on the implication of the adaptation regime to sea-level rise issues. As such, she does 
not focus on the adaptation legal regime regarding environmental issues in the law of the sea.39  
Despite the relative lack of legal attention devoted to climate adaptation, which this thesis 
intends to help address, climate adaptation is highly significant to the LOS. Climate change alters 
the physical, economic, and sociopolitical context within which human systems were designed 
and function, necessitating wide-ranging adjustments and reforms. Climate impacts on human 
systems are universal in scope but vary greatly given disparate local physical effects and 
corresponding societal responses. This combined variability and universality necessitates the 
adaptation of social, political, legal, and ecological systems at the local, regional, national, and 
international levels. A further complication is that climate impacts manifest continuously and 
with increasing intensity, so human systems must adjust to constantly changing baseline 
conditions.40 As McDonald notes, legal adaptation will be difficult and complex. 
 
36 See Craig, Robin Kundis. (2020). Mitigation and Adaptation. In The Law of the Sea and Climate Change: Solutions and 
Constraints, pp. 49-80. 
37 See Johansen & Henriksen (2020), pp. 239–258. 
38 See Oral, Nilüfer. (2018). Ocean Acidification: Falling Between the Legal Cracks of UNCLOS and the UNFCCC? Ecology 
Law Quarterly, 45(1), pp. 9–30; Oral (2019), pp. 415–439.  
39 See Ibid. 
40 See Craig, Robin Kundis. (2010). ‘Stationarity is Dead’ – Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change 
Adaptation Law. The Harvard Environmental Law Review : HELR, 34(1), p. 15. 
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[The] combination of sudden shocks and creeping change, compounded by the scale and 
unpredictability of irreversible consequences of climate change, distinguish it from other 
environmental, social, and economic stressors to which we have previously responded. 
Adapting to the impacts of climate change in the long term, therefore, poses a unique and 
unprecedented challenge for law.41  
Indeed, Craig argues that climate change poses a particular challenge to law and governance 
frameworks built on assumptions of unchanging environmental conditions, which will degrade 
amid widespread climate change.42 Indeed, climate change affects virtually every aspect of 
oceans governance, and its effects are not sequestered by LOSC regime or part.  
Chapter II:  The Climate Adaptation Regime 
Developing Climate Adaptation Law 
 Necessary to analyzing the climate adaptation regime’s significance to the law of the sea 
is understanding the regime’s legal content and nature. As the IPCC has noted, the development 
of this regime is ongoing but accelerating despite the historic focus of climate action on 
mitigation. “As impacts of climate change have become apparent around the world, adaptation 
has attracted increasing attention”.43 The Paris Agreement marked a substantial development for 
the adaptation regime, giving it equal priority to mitigation, establishing its long-term goals, and 
clarifying that adaptation is not only a local issue but an international one.44 Despite the difficulty 
inherent to adaptation, this regime has developed increasing legal weight within climate change 
law, evolving a set of associated rules and norms. While the theoretical and practical 
establishment of peremptory norms and general principles of international law remains subject to 
robust discussion, the ICJ Statute provides some guidance.45 Article 38 enumerates sources of 
international law, and this thesis finds identifiable adaptation duties in many of these sources, 
including international conventions, evolving international custom indicated by nascent state 
practice, general principles recognized by the international community, and legal scholarship.46  
 
41 McDonald, Jan. (2011). The Role of Law in Adapting to Climate Change. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews. Climate Change, 
2(2), pp. 283-284. 
42 See ibid., pp. 9–73. 
43 See IPCC (2014)., p. 873. 
44 See Lesnikowski, A., Ford, J., Biesbroek, R., Berrang-Ford, L., Maillet, M., Araos, M., & Austin, S. E. (2017). “What does the 
Paris Agreement mean for adaptation?” Climate Policy, 17(7), pp. 827–828. 
45 See International Law Commission (ILC), Fifth report on identification of customary international law by Michael Wood, 
Special Rapporteur (14 March 2018), United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.4/717, pp. 4-53. 
46 ICJ Statute, Art 38. 
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Legal scholars have generally noted the relative weakness of adaptation obligations in the 
Paris Agreement. Dimitrov found that developed countries, by promising stronger mitigation 
measures, were successful in reducing binding obligations relating to international cooperation 
on adaptation. Dimitrov’s analysis, however, is a relative one, and though the Agreement’s 
adaptation articles may be weaker than those relating to mitigation, that does not entail that the 
Paris Agreement includes no adaptation duties at all.47 Bodansky determined that the Paris 
Agreement’s articles on adaptation do impose some legal obligations on states, including a 
requirement that states engage in adaptation planning and adaptation actions as appropriate. 
Beyond these relatively few concrete obligations, however, Bodansky notes that many of the 
Paris Agreement’s adaptation articles either represent non-binding collective obligations for 
developed states, use recommendatory language, or are broadly institutional in nature.48 
Exploring the adaptation of aquaculture to climate change, Dahl did not find a hard obligation in 
the Paris Agreement for states to adapt to climate change—likely as it is within states’ self-
interest to do so anyway. She did note, however: 
Specifically, the Paris Agreement requires the parties to engage in adaptation planning 
processes and implementation of actions. Although the binding character of the obligation 
has been weakened by modifiers, the Agreement does entail a certain degree of 
commitment.49 
Rajamani meanwhile finds that the Paris Agreement does include qualified adaptation 
requirements for parties, though they are somewhat discretionary and softer than for mitigation.50 
International relations scholars Hall and Persson, analyzing the legalization of global adaptation 
governance, assert that adaptation legal duties are comparatively lower in precision and 
obligation than are duties to mitigate climate change. They do note that adaptation obligations 
exist, and they find the regime’s underdevelopment likely due to the still contested nature of 
adaptation as an international issue (rather than a local problem) and because international 
 
47 See Dimitrov, Radoslav S. (2016). The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Behind Closed Doors. Global Environmental 
Politics, 16(3), pp. 1–11.  
48 See Bodansky, Daniel. (2016). The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement. Review of European, Comparative & 
International Environmental Law, 25(2), pp. 146–147. 
49 Dahl (2020), p. 290. 
50 See Rajamani, Lavanya. (2016). Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretive Possibilities and 
Underlying Politics. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 65(2), p. 502.  
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climate negotiations involving developed states include weaker adaptation obligations in a 
“package deal” with stronger mitigation obligations.51  
Legal scholars emphasizing the weakness of adaptation obligations in the Paris 
Agreement often frame their discussion in relation to the significantly more developed mitigation 
regime, and in doing so, miss key points. For instance, they often fail to acknowledge that 
international climate law, including the adaptation regime, is not solely determined by the Paris 
Agreement. While some parts of the adaptation regime are more extensively codified than others, 
its legal regime may also derive from or find support in other sources of international law, such 
as the human rights regime. Furthermore, adaptation and mitigation differ in that climate treaties 
frame adaptation as an obligation of conduct, and the exact scope and content of that obligation 
are still developing given the inherent complexity of adaptation.52 Despite the relative infancy of 
the climate adaptation legal regime, this thesis argues that it does entail legal obligations that 
may be considered developing rules of international law. Namely, this includes two core 
obligations: 1) States have an individual obligation to adapt to climate change; and 2) States have 
a general obligation to cooperate in facilitating international adaptation to climate change, 
particularly regarding the needs of vulnerable states. 
Adaptation as a National Obligation 
This thesis argues that states have a national obligation to facilitate adaption to climate 
change to safeguard the security and wellbeing of their citizens. For the most vulnerable, failure 
to adapt could have the effect of depriving states of permanent populations, defined territories, or 
functioning governments, undermining their very capacity to be considered states.53 Failure to 
adapt can also entail negative consequences for other states. For instance, failure to secure 
coastal livelihoods may contribute to transboundary population displacement, and failure to 
adapt agricultural practices could contribute to regional food supply issues. 54 Beyond these 
practical implications, a national obligation to facilitate adaptation can be identified from 
multiple sources of international law indicated by Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ.55 
 
51 See Hall & Persson (2018), pp. 540–566.  
52 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (9 May 1992; in force 21 March 1994), 1771 UNTS 107. Art 4. 
53 See Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (26 December 1933, in force 26 December 1934), 165 LNTS 19 
(Montevideo Convention), Art. 1. 
54 Benzie, Magnus & Harris, Katy (2020) Transboundary climate risk and adaptation. Science for Adaptation Policy Brief 2, 
World Adaptation Science Programme, Secretariat, United Nations Environmental Programme, Nairobi.  
55 ICJ Statute, Art. 38. 
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 A qualified national adaptation obligation can be identified from multiple international 
instruments. Article 4(1)(b) of the UNFCCC commits states to formulate, implement, publish, 
and regularly update national programmes containing measures to facilitate adequate climate 
adaptation. While the measures’ specifics and the level of adaptation required to be considered 
“adequate” are discretionary, the article obliges states to be engaged in implementing measures 
intended to facilitate adaptation.56 Article 4(1)(f) further commits states to account for climate 
change considerations in domestic policymaking, which may support both adaptive and 
mitigative aims.57 Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol reaffirms states’ adaptation obligations under 
Article 4 of the UNFCCC. It further indicates options for states to adapt to climate change, 
referencing the adoption of technologies and improved spatial planning measures, and it commits 
states to communicate their adaptation plans with the international community. 58  
The Paris Agreement further detailed the adaptation regime, providing more specificity 
regarding states’ obligations than past climate agreements. Article 7 obliges states, as 
appropriate, to engage in planning and implementing climate change adaptation policies that may 
include specific adaptation actions or efforts (such as seawall construction), national adaptation 
plan formulation, climate impact and vulnerability assessment (taking into account vulnerable 
people, places, and ecosystems), adaptation plan monitoring and evaluation, and building 
socioeconomic and ecological resilience to climate impacts through economic diversification and 
sustainable management of natural resources.59 The Agreement also requires states to 
communicate and update national adaptation plans with the international community.60 The 
language of Article 7—“Each Party shall, as appropriate, engage in… the implementation of 
actions”—does not necessarily require that parties act, but it does indicate a qualified obligation 
to engage in adaptation processes that include actually implementing adaptation measures.61 
 Various soft law instruments and aspirational documents support the concept that states 
have a national obligation to adapt to climate change, though states largely have discretion on 
what those adaptation measures entail. The Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP) 
established the Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAF) in 2010 to enhance international 
 
56 UNFCCC, Art. 4(1)(b). 
57 Ibid., Art. 4(1)(f). 
58 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (signed Dec. 10, 1997) (Kyoto 
Protocol), 2303 UNTS 148, 37 ILM 22 (1998), Art. 10. 
59 Paris Agreement, Art. 7(9). 
60 Ibid., Art. 7(10-12). 
61 Ibid., Art. 7(9). 
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adaptation action. The CAF, noting states’ adaptation commitments under the UNFCCC, lays out 
a framework for enhanced adaptation action. While leaving individual measures to state 
discretion, it invites states to take measures like strengthening institutional adaptive capacity, 
building resilience into socio-economic systems, and relocating vulnerable groups where 
necessary.62 The next year’s COP culminated in the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
clarified the objective of national adaptation planning under the UNFCCC. The COP agreed that 
adaptation plans are nationally determined, but the objective of planning is to reduce 
vulnerability to climate impacts. Planning, therefore, entails actual action.63 Similarly, the parties 
to the later Paris Agreement acknowledge that adaptation measures, though discretionary, should 
consider additional norms such as consideration of indigenous knowledge, the interests of 
vulnerable groups, and reliance on best available science.64 
 Work by the ILA also supports the rule that states have a national obligation to adapt to 
climate change. Principle 1 of the Sydney Declaration of Principles on the Protection of Persons 
Displaced in the Context of Sea Level Rise holds that states have primary responsibility for 
providing protection and assistance to people living in areas vulnerable to sea-level rise. 
Furthermore, Principle 3 outlines a duty to take positive action to adapt to sea-level rise’s 
adverse effects.65 The Declaration of Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change also entails a 
national adaptive obligation. Draft Article 3 for instance commits states to adaptation for the 
purposes of sustainable development while Draft Article 7 holds that states shall minimize the 
adverse effects of climate change through adaptation measures.66  
 National adaptation may also be necessary to fulfilling other international legal 
obligations. While climate law does not establish any right to adaptation, climate change can 
infringe on the ability of individuals to exercise guaranteed international human rights. The 
United Nations Environmental Programme has noted, for instance, that climate change may 
impact individuals’ rights to water, sanitation, health, life, food, and adequate living standards 
 
62 The Cancun Adaptation Framework and The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Cancun Adaptation Framework). Part II, para. 
20. Also embodied in Parts I(2)(b), 2(12), 2(14-16), 2(20)(c), and 2(32). 
63 See Report of the Conference of the Parties on its seventeenth session, held in Durban from 28 November to 11 December 
2011. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, Decision 5/CP.17 (I. Framing national adaptation plans), p. 80. 
64 Paris Agreement, Art 7(5). 
65 International Law Association, Sydney Declaration of Principles on the Protection of Persons Displaced in the Context of Sea 
Level Rise (2018), the Committee on International Law and Sea Level Rise, Resolution 6/2018 (2018 Sydney Declaration). 
66 International Law Association, Declaration of Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change (2014), the Committee on Legal 
Principles Relating to Climate Change adopted Resolution 2/2014 at the 76th Conference of the International Law Association, 
Draft Arts. 3 and 7. 
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amongst others.67 In that line, UNHCR Resolution 18/22 indicates that human rights obligations 
may inform climate change policy and that climate change must not be permitted to deprive 
people of means of subsistence.68 The UN Human Rights Council Resolution 47/24 in July 2021 
reiterated its ongoing position that climate impacts have direct and indirect implications for the 
effective enjoyment of human rights, and those impacts will be most acute for people particularly 
vulnerable due to geography, disability, gender, age, and other factors.69  
Not only will climate change impact individuals’ exercise of human rights, but states 
have a positive obligation to adapt to avert predictable climate impacts—particularly those 
leading to violations of non-derogable human rights such as the rights to life and health.70 The 
UN body monitoring compliance with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) has stated that failure to prevent foreseeable human rights harm 
caused by climate change breaches the ICESCR and Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter.71 As 
of July 2021, the ICESCR had 171 parties, including the vast majority of states parties to the 
LOSC.72 International courts have found states liable for failing to avert foreseeable dangers or 
risks. In the Corfu Channel Case, for instance, the ICJ held Albania responsible not for the act of 
laying mines in its territorial waters but for the consequences of those mines.73 Furthermore, 
states may be liable for failing to protect against foreseeable environmental threats impacting 
individual human rights. In Budayeva and Others vs. Russia, the European Court of Human 
Rights determined that Russian authorities violated human rights in failing to respond to or 
inform the public in advance of known environmental problems that resulted in loss of life.74 
 States adapting to climate change could also arguably be considered a developing 
international custom. In practical reality, states will respond to respond to changing climate 
 
67 “Climate Change and Human Rights,” United Nations Environment Programme; Columbia University, Sabin Center on 
Climate Change Law (2016), p. 1. 
68 Human Rights Council, Human rights and climate change, Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council. United Nations 
General Assembly (17 October 2011), A/HRC/RES/18/22. 
69 Human Rights Council, Human rights and climate change. Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council, United Nations 
General Assembly. (13 July 2021), A/HCR/47/L.19. 
70 See UN Human Rights Committee, 1984, General Comment No. 14: Article 6 (Right to Life) Nuclear Weapons and the Right 
to Life, 9 November 1984, UN Document HR1/GEN/1/REV.9 (Vol. I). 
71 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Climate change and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Statement of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (8 October 2018), E/C.12/2018/1*, p. 2 
[5].; & Charter of the United Nations (18 April 1946; in force 24 October 1945)  (UN Charter), Arts. 55-56. 
72 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. (16 December 1966, in force 3 January 1976) (ICESCR). 
UNTS Vol. 993, p. 3. 
73 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits), 1949, ICJ Rep. 4.; For a thorough examination of states’ human rights 
obligations regarding climate change, see Wewerinke-Singh, Margaretha (2018). Attributing Climate Change-Related Conduct to 
States. In State Responsibility, Climate Change and Human Rights Under International Law, pp. 1–190, and 85-96 in particular.  
74 See Budayeva and Others v Russia (2008) (App. No. 15339/00) Eur. Ct. H.R., pp. 29-30 [147-160]. 
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conditions to protect vital state interests (like vulnerable economic assets), and they are indeed 
doing so. A global review of national legislation found that 170 countries have enacted 
adaptation measures by 2019.75 As Harrison notes, the ICJ determined in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases, that a conventional rule can quickly develop a customary rule provided 
that state practice included that of “specially affected” states.76 Determination of “specially 
affected” is dependent on context, and international climate law emphasizes the importance of 
climate action for developing and climate-vulnerable states.77 Notably, 120 out of 153 
developing countries had engaged in adaptation planning by October 2019—increasing nearly 20 
percent from 2018.78 Beyond the practical necessity of doing so, that states’ have engaged in 
legalized processes under the UNFCCC in line with their treaty obligations may be taken as 
evidence of opinio juris—that states feel legally obliged to do so. 
Adaptation as an International Cooperative Obligation 
 States are further obliged to cooperate in facilitating international climate adaptation with 
a particular emphasis on the adaptation needs of developing and climate-vulnerable states. 
Though the local nature of adaptation might support the notion that States’ adaptive obligations 
end at their borders, this perception misses the necessity of cooperation, which may accelerate 
adaptation by synchronizing regional strategies and spreading best practices and technologies.79 
And given that climate adaptation can entail negative consequences—an issue known as 
“maladaptation”—states must cooperate to avoid adverse transboundary effects.80 Climate 
change’s scale entails that impacts well beyond the capacity of some vulnerable states to handle, 
while many of those states contributed little to the overall issue of climate change. In those cases, 
international cooperation may prove vital to guaranteeing human security. 
Adverse climate impacts will affect states unequally, varying by geography and 
according to the level of defenses states can afford to deploy. While developed states may be 
capable of building expensive seawalls, developing states may not, leaving vulnerable 
 
75 Nachmany, M., Byrnes, R., & Surminski, S. (2019). (rep.). National laws and policies on climate change adaptation: a global 
review. London, UK: London School of Economics and Political Science, p. 2. 
76 See Harrison, James. (2008). Evolution of the law of the sea: developments in law-making in the wake of the 1982 Law of the 
Sea Convention. The University of Edinburgh., p. 51 referencing North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Germany v. Denmark; 
Germany v. Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 42 [73]. 
77 Paris Agreement, Art. 7. 
78 Crawford, A., & Church, C. (2020). (rep.). The NAP Process and Peacebuilding. NAP Global Network, p. 6. 
79 For an overview of the reasoning underpinning cooperation on adaptation, see Carlarne et al. (2016), pp. 18-21. 
80 See Scheraga, J., & Grambsch, A. (1998). (rep.). Risks, opportunities, and adaptation to climate change. United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC. pp. 92–93. 
 17 
populations to cope with an issue not of their making. This relative disparity of responsibility and 
resources is recognized in the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities” (CBDR-RC), as embedded in climate treaties. The UNFCCC states,  
[… The] global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all 
countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities 
and their social and economic conditions.81 
Developed states have more responsibility for climate action, which as Rajamani argues, builds 
on the polluter-pays principle obliging those responsible for pollution to cover its costs.82  
CBDR-RC applies to both mitigation and adaptation, but it does not establish liability 
requiring developed states to compensate others for climate damages.83 Developing states pushed 
unsuccessfully for liability to receive equal status with adaptation and mitigation in climate law, 
but liability seems to have fallen within the adaptation regime. The Warsaw International 
Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts (Warsaw 
Mechanism) was established under the CAF, and it is tasked with inter alia facilitating support 
of actions addressing losses associated with climate impacts.84 The Paris Agreement, which 
focused on voluntary nationally determined contributions rather than hard national commitments, 
indicates that the Warsaw Mechanism is non-binding.85 Though CBDR-RC does not necessarily 
entail explicit commitments to facilitate international adaptation, CBDR-RC is still important to 
the interpretation of states’ obligations under climate law.  
 As with the individual state obligation to adapt, a cooperative adaptation obligation may 
be identified in climate treaties. Article 4(1)(b) commits states to formulate and implement 
appropriate regional programmes containing measures to facilitate adaptation. More explicitly, 
Article 4(1)(e) reads that states shall cooperate in preparing for adaptation.86 As Jakobsen notes,  
It follows from Article 4(1)(e) that the parties are obliged to cooperate ‘in preparing for 
adaptation to the impacts of climate change’, and more specifically to ‘develop and elaborate 
 
81 UNFCCC, Preamble. 
82 See Rajamani, Lavanya. (2000). The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility and the Balance of Commitments 
under the Climate Regime. Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, 9(2), 120–131.  
83 UNFCCC, Arts 3(1), 4(1), and 4(3); see Eckersley, Robyn (2015). The common but differentiated responsibilities of states to 
assist and receive ‘climate refugees’ European Journal of Political Theory, 14(4), pp. 481–500.  
84 Decision 2/CP.19, Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its nineteenth session, UNFCCC, FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1 
(2014), pp. 6-8. 
85 See Paris Agreement, Art. 8. 
86 UNFCCC, Art. 4(1)(e). 
 18 
appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone management . . . and for the protection and 
rehabilitation of areas.’87 
Furthermore, Article 4(8) explains that these commitments should be implemented considering 
the needs of small island countries and those with low-lying coastal areas, areas prone to natural 
disasters, and areas with fragile ecosystems.88 The full scope of this obligation is not enumerated, 
but it may include inter alia financial support and information- and technology sharing.89 
Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol reaffirms and slightly expands on states’ cooperative 
obligations under the UNFCCC, referencing some additional measures states may take in 
cooperating on climate adaptation. For instance, Article 10 expands on UNFCCC Article 4 
obligation to formulate, implement, and regularly update regional programmes (where 
appropriate), referencing adaptation technologies and spatial planning as areas of potential 
cooperation. It further references cooperation regarding adaptation technology and knowledge 
sharing, and international capacity building. Additionally, Article 11 indicates that financial 
assistance is significant to states’ cooperative adaptation obligations.90  
 Parallel to the developing international focus on adaptation, the Paris Agreement goes 
beyond either the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol in elaborating on states’ adaptation 
obligations. Article 7 enumerates that the global goal on adaptation is to enhance adaptive 
capacity, strengthen resilience, and reduce vulnerability to climate change. Article 7(5) 
acknowledges that adaptation should follow a country-driven approach designed to integrate 
adaptation with relevant policy frameworks, but it further recognizes the importance of 
international cooperation on adaptation efforts—particularly for developing climate-vulnerable 
states.91 Regarding these cooperative aspects, the Agreement holds that States Parties should 
increase cooperation with measures that include, inter alia, sharing information and best 
practices, strengthening institutional arrangements to share technical guidance, scientific 
knowledge sharing, and adaptation practices sharing.92 This is not a conclusive list, and the 
Agreement indicates that states should generally strengthen cooperation regarding “[i]mproving 
the effectiveness and durability of adaptation actions”.93 The Paris Agreement reiterates past 
 
87 Jakobsen (2020), p. 244. 
88 UNFCCC, Art 4(8). 
89 See ibid., Arts. 4(1)(h), 4(4), & 4(9). 
90 Kyoto Protocol, Art. 10(b-e) & 11 
91 See Paris Agreement, Art. 7(5-6). 
92 See ibid., Art. 7(7). 
93 Ibid., Art. 7(7)(e). 
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calls for enhanced international support for developing countries regarding adaptation, but it 
goes further in elaborating on financial assistance to vulnerable states.94  
 Beneath the level of specific state obligations as laid out in international climate 
agreements, a body of soft law supports the concept that states have a general obligation to 
cooperate in adapting to climate change. Article 7(2) of the Paris Agreement for instance 
recognizes that adaptation is a global challenge with regional and international dimensions and 
that cooperation is a key aspect of protecting against climate change’s impacts on people, 
livelihoods, and ecosystems.95 Article 7(6) further notes that cooperation is particularly important 
for developing countries, particularly those that are highly vulnerable to climate change. Along 
this line, Article 7(7) of the Paris Agreement holds that states should recognize the Cancun 
Adaptation Framework in strengthening cooperation on enhancing adaptation.96 Part I of the 
CAF enumerates a shared vision for long-term cooperative action affirming that States Parties 
should cooperate to enable adaptation, and that building developing country capacity to adapt is 
critical to the UNFCCC.97 Part II of the CAF holds that,  
[… International] cooperation on adaptation is urgently required to enable and support the 
implementation of adaptation actions aimed at reducing vulnerability and building resilience 
in developing country Parties, taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of those 
developing states that are particularly vulnerable.98 
It requests that developed states, considering the needs of the climate-vulnerable, provide scaled-
up, long-term resources to facilitate both local and regional adaptation plans, programmes, and 
projects. Furthermore, it attempts to set up structures to facilitate international information- and 
technical guidance sharing and to monitor global adaptation efforts.99 
The work of the ILA explicitly supports the concept that states must cooperate in 
adapting to climate change. The Sydney Declaration of Principles on the Protection of Persons 
Displaced in the Context of Sea Level Rise explicitly recognizes a cooperative adaptive 
obligation in the LOS regime. Principle 4, “The Duty to Cooperate,” entails that states are 
obliged to assist vulnerable states with climate adaptation.100 Notably, the ILA holds that this 
 
94 See Paris Agreement., Arts. 7(13), 9(1), & 9(5). 
95 See ibid., Art. 7(2). 
96 Paris Agreement, Art. 7(7). 
97 Cancun Adaptation Framework, p. 3. 
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principle can be derived from existing legal provisions and/or frameworks.101 The ILA 
Declaration of Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change enumerates similar principles. 
Article 10 is specific to the law of the sea, and it holds that States should apply, interpret, and 
enforce their rights and obligations under the LOSC in a manner facilitating adaptation.102 
Similarly, Article 5 indicates that states have a responsibility to cooperate in developing an 
equitable climate regime subject to CBDR-RC. This regime includes adaptation, and developed 
states are to assist climate-vulnerable states in adapting.103 Article 6 further calls on states to take 
full account of the special circumstances and needs of small island and other climate-vulnerable 
developing states. Article 8 focuses exclusively on international cooperation on climate change 
action, including adaptation. It calls on states to cooperate in good faith on addressing climate 
change’s adverse effects (which includes adaptation), indicating that developed countries have a 
responsibility to assist developing countries. One aspect of this cooperative obligation is that 
states are to develop legal and institutional frameworks of international law to address climate 
change’s adverse effects.104 Along this line, Article 10 calls on states to formulate and implement 
climate law in a mutually supportive manner with other relevant international law; furthermore, 
this specifically references the relationship of climate law and the law of the sea regimes.105  
The human rights regime obliges states to adapt to protect their citizens’ individual 
human rights. Similar reasoning provides grounds for arguing that states are obliged to cooperate 
to protect the human rights of climate-vulnerable people beyond their borders. The UN Human 
Rights Committee has repeatedly recognized linkages between climate change and human rights, 
including the necessity of cooperation. It further emphasizes cooperation as necessary to enable 
implementation of the UNFCCC.106 Additionally, the ICESCR entails a positive obligation for 
states to act, including through cooperation, to realize the human rights recognized in the 
convention. 107 According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), this constitutes a cooperative obligation requiring states to assist and cooperate, 
depending on resources, to facilitate the fulfillment of human rights in other states, including 
 
101 See Declaration of Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change, preamble. 
102 Declaration of Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change, Draft Art. 10. 
103 Ibid., Draft Art. 5.  
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through disaster relief, emergency assistance, and assistance to displaced people.108 Climate 
adaptation arguably falls within the parameters of that enumerated obligation, which the 
OHCHR has further emphasized is consistent with CBDR-RC and the UNFCCC.109  
The human rights regime generally holds states responsible for the human rights of 
citizens within their borders. Knox holds that this complicates its applicability to climate issues 
given the difficulty of extending human rights law to harms occurring outside the responsible 
state’s borders.110 On the other hand, Knox notes the duty to cooperate in Article 56 of the UN 
Charter, and the duty obligation to cooperate in the promotion of and observance of human rights 
in Article 55.111 While this may not provide forceful grounds for imposing adaptation duties on 
states regarding the rights of citizens in other states, multiple commentators have argued that 
developed states hold some responsibility for persons in developing states suffering the adverse 
effects of developed states’ failure to mitigate climate change—particularly in light of CBDR-
RC.112 Cullet, for instance, emphasizes that the ecological aspect of climate adaptation is relevant 
to states’ obligations to protect the environment beyond their borders: “If there is a human right 
to environment, the corresponding duties will be for States to prevent the impacts of climate 
change that, at the same time, assist in the realization of human rights”.113 
The Content of Adaptation Obligations  
The adaptation regime is still developing, but this thesis holds that it still entails a level of 
legal obligation for states to individually adapt to climate change and to generally cooperate in 
facilitating international adaptation. The purpose of this regime is, ultimately, to safeguard 
human security against adverse climate impacts, and it involves adapting both human and 
ecological systems. While arguably constituting developing international rules, they involve 
relatively imprecise obligations compared to the mitigation regime, and their contents are still 
evolving. States may be obliged to engage in adaptation, but how they do so seems discretionary.  
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The Paris Agreement is most explicit regarding the contents of states’ individual 
adaptation obligations. It requires states to engage in adaptation planning processes and 
implement adaptation measures as appropriate. Furthermore, states are obliged to submit and 
update international communications regarding their adaptation plans. Adaptation efforts 
generally fall within the Paris Agreement’s cross-cutting provision holding that all climate 
efforts will progressively increase over time.114 States’ cooperative obligation to facilitate 
international adaptation, particularly from developed countries to climate-vulnerable developing 
states, is less defined than states’ national obligations. Climate treaties do not fully enumerate 
what this entails but list areas of possible cooperation, such as coastal zone management.115 The 
Paris Agreement enumerates key elements for enhancing cooperation on adaptation, detailing 
information- and financial resource-sharing aspects. These measures may be characterized as 
collective duties entailing some level of obligation by individual states. Furthermore, these 
measures do not comprise the totality of states’ cooperative obligations, particularly given that 
the Paris Agreement must be understood to be expanding an already extant adaptation regime.116 
As Perez and Kallhauge note, “Under the Convention, parties already had an obligation to 
cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change”.117  
While the content of states’ adaptation obligations remains relatively discretionary, their 
fulfillment—and indeed the development of the regime more broadly—remains subject to the 
general principles of environmental law and to developing norms and standards under the 
climate law regime. For instance, the principles of equity and CBDR-RC are central to general 
climate change law, while legal scholars have also noted the applicability of additional principles 
and concepts, such as precaution, polluter pays, and intergenerational equity.118 The Paris 
Agreement applies additional principles to the adaptation regime. Article 7(5) holds, 
Parties acknowledge that adaptation action should follow a country-driven, gender-
responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable 
groups, communities and ecosystems, and should be based on and guided by the best 
available science and, as appropriate, traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous 
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peoples and local knowledge systems, with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant 
socioeconomic and environmental policies and actions, where appropriate.119  
Beyond these stated principles, additional norms specific to adaptation seem likely to develop. 
Craig and Ruhl have discussed potential principles of climate adaptation law, and the ILA’s 
Declaration of Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change may provide additional guidance.120 
Soft law instruments such as the Cancun Adaptation Framework may also provide guidance by 
detailing appropriate measures to fulfill adaptation obligations, such as vulnerability and impact 
assessments, strengthening institutional capacity to enable adaptation, enhancing disaster risk 
reduction strategies, and improving public awareness.121  
Clarity regarding the content of the adaptation regime seems likely to emerge as 
adaptation attracts increasing international attention. While the regime continues to develop, an 
obligation need not be highly precise to carry legal weight. For instance, the extent of states’ 
general obligations to protect and preserve the marine environment under LOSC Article 192 is 
not precise. Nevertheless, states’ general obligation to protect and preserve the marine 
environment is still legally binding for states parties, and the understood content and scope of 
Article 192 have developed since the LOSC came into force.122 Though comparatively 
imprecise, adaptation obligations should be understood as developing hard legal obligations.   
Adaptation Obligations as Obligations Erga Omnes 
Though the full scope and content of states’ adaptation obligations are developing, these 
duties may be of erga omnes character. Obligations erga omnes are universal duties based on 
common values and interests owed to the entire international community. They arise when an 
issue, given its significance or character, must be managed collectively and on behalf of the 
international community.123 The most recognized obligations erga omnes are found in the human 
rights regime, including prohibitions on extreme acts such as slavery. These typically also 
 
119 Paris Agreement, Art. 7(5). 
120 See Craig, R.K. (2010), pp. 9-69.; Ruhl (2010), pp. 363-435.; & Declaration of Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change 
(2014). 
121 See Cancun Adaptation Framework, Part II, pp. 4-7.  
122 Note the Arbitral Tribunal’s clarification of Article 192 in the South China Sea Arbitration award from pp. 373-376. See also 
Kojima, Chie. (2017). South China Sea Arbitration and the Protection of the Marine Environment: Evolution of UNCLOS Part 
XII Through Interpretation and the Duty to Cooperate. Asian Yearbook of International Law, 2017, Vol. 21, pp. 166-180.  
123 Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law; Report 
of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. ILC Study Group on the 
Fragmentation of International Law. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 and Add.1 and Corr. 1. New York, International Law Commission 
(2006) (ILC Fragmentation Report), p. 198 [391].; see also Sciaccaluga, Giovanni. (2020). The erga omnes Obligation to 
Mitigate and Manage Climate Change. In International Law and the Protection of “Climate Refugees,”, pp. 97-98. 
 24 
represent jus cogens norms; however, while just cogens norms are by nature also obligations 
erga omnes, the reverse is not necessarily true. Obligations need not rise to the level of just 
cogens norms to be considered erga omnes, though they do not necessarily have the clear 
superiority over other obligations that jus cogens norms do.124  
 Most recognized obligations erga omnes derive from the human rights regime, and that 
may include a collective obligation to the environment. The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights’ advisory opinion supported the existence of an individual and collective right to a 
healthy environment. “In its collective dimension, the right to a healthy environment constitutes 
a universal value that is owed to both present and future generations”.125 Robinson notes that 178 
national constitutions recognize a right to the environment, arguing that the duty to protect the 
environment is of erga omnes character if not yet a peremptory norm.126 The ILC has also 
discussed obligations “of essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the 
human environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the 
seas” as jus cogens norms, which would by nature also confer erga omnes character.127  
 States’ obligations to the environment are not necessarily dependent on human rights, 
however. The ICJ judgment in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case framed protection of the 
environment as an issue significant for the whole of mankind, and Vice-President 
Weeremantry’s separate opinion further focused on environmental damage as an issue with an 
erga omnes character.128 Boyle, based on the ICJ  Whaling Case judgment, argues that while not 
all environmental treaties may be considered of erga omnes character, the South China Sea 
Arbitration indicates that environmental protection obligations under LOSC Part XII are of erga 
omnes character.129 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’s (ITLOS) advisory 
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opinion relating to states’ obligations in the Area also held that duties to protect and preserve the 
marine environment were of erga omnes character.130  
 States have an obligation erga omnes to protect the environment, and adaptation must be 
considered a critical component to fulfilling that obligation in light of climate change. Indeed, 
climate treaties have repeatedly emphasized that adaptation is a crucial aspect of protecting 
ecosystems from adverse climate effects.131 As Boyle notes, the UNFCCC holds that parties 
should take precautionary measures to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Given the potential 
of serious or irreversible environmental risks, the precautionary principle or approach would 
support the case that states should adapt to climate change to protect the environment.132 
Furthermore, while obligations erga omnes typically derive from human rights instruments, they 
may certainly derive from climate treaties. The ICJ held in the Barcelona Traction Case that 
some obligations erga omnes may be conferred by international instruments of a universal or 
quasi-universal character.133 Similarly, the Institut de Droit International has stated that 
obligations erga omnes may derive from multilateral treaties given common values and 
concerns.134 With virtually universal membership, the UNFCCC is a multilateral instrument or 
treaty from which obligations erga omnes could be derived. Zemanek, in exploring the 
development and enforcement of such duties, argues explicitly that environmental obligations 
under the UNFCCC and other environmental treaties are of erga omnes character.135 Verheyen 
and Zengerling similarly note that climate action obligations under the UNFCCC, given its 
universal acceptance, could constitute obligations erga omnes.136 
Though mitigation and adaptation may both be significant to the fulfillment of states’ 
environmental duties, the adaptation regime includes not only ecological adaptation but also the 
societal and legal measures necessary to adapt human systems. As Sciaccaluga notes, there are 
non-environmental grounds to consider adaptation obligations as of erga omnes character. 
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Climate change impacts every state and inflicts severe socio-political consequences that risk 
upsetting the functioning of the entire international system. As such, establishing national and 
international adaptation policies is an obligation erga omnes aiming to protect the fundamental 
and essential interests of the international community.137 The human rights regime is again 
relevant here as climate adaptation is significant to fulfilling minimum human rights in climate-
vulnerable areas, lending adaptation to further erga omnes consideration. As such, adaptation is 
an obligation with erga omnes character when applied to either ecological or human systems. 
 As a practical matter, adaptation obligations erga omnes provide legal standing to any 
state to invoke the responsibility of states violating either their national or cooperative duties to 
adapt to climate change at international courts or tribunals.138 Per Article 48(1)(b) of the ILC’s 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), any state 
is entitled to invoke another state’s responsibility where that state breaches an obligation owed to 
the international community as a whole.139 Article 12 indicates that a breach of an international 
obligation requires a state action out of conformity with the requirements of that obligation. 
Given that adaptation entails a positive obligation to act nationally and internationally to address 
climate change’s adverse impacts, non-response must be understood to be an act constituting a 
breach of adaptation obligations.140 Furthermore, adaptation obligations as obligations erga 
omnes may be relevant to the LOS regime. According to the ILC, regimes such as the law of the 
sea (“self-contained regimes”) may not deviate from general law on state responsibility where 
the obligations have erga omnes character.141 Though obligations erga omnes do not carry the 
weight of jus cogens norms, they thus remain relevant to interpreting and applying the LOSC. 
Chapter III: Development of the Law of the Sea in Response to Climate Law 
Evolutionary Capacity of the LOSC 
The evolution of climate change rules and norms, including the adaptation regime, seems 
an important international legal development, but how are such developments relevant to the law 
of the sea? The LOSC is a legal framework designed to settle issues relating to the LOS in 
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tandem with broader developments in international law. 142 That it provides little clarity on 
climate issues effectively necessitates the regime’s further development.143 To this end, it has 
various mechanisms to incorporate and address new governance issues as they emerge, allowing 
the regime to develop in response to changing global conditions and emerging international 
needs, rules, and practices.144 Not all of these “evolutionary pathways” are equally suited to 
considering legal adaptation obligations, however. With an eye de lege ferenda, the LOSC 
should facilitate systematic consideration of climate adaptation needs throughout the convention. 
Reforming specific articles or regimes within the LOSC to address individual climate issues may 
fail to address the myriad of other ways in which climate change stresses oceans governance. The 
variable and continuously manifesting nature of climate change entails that consideration of 
adaptation should be an ongoing process, or at least adaptive to changing conditions. As Vidas et 
al. note, climate change impacts the conditions and context within law systems operate, requiring 
that those systems fundamentally adapt. “International law will not be able to respond adequately 
by simply amending some rules or adding new ones: systemic change is necessary”.145  
One evolutionary pathway to facilitate systematic and continuous consideration of 
climate adaptation obligations is direct amendment as outlined in LOSC Articles 312-316.146 
Directly amending the LOSC would allow the treaty to incorporate climate considerations; 
however, it seems highly unlikely that it would serve as an effective mechanism for the LOSC to 
integrate climate considerations. Direct amendment has never been successful due to the 
procedural and political difficulties inherent in rewriting the law of the sea, which would be 
doubly complicated by the traditionally contested political considerations of climate action.  
Another suboptimal mechanism for the convention to integrate new climate change-
related international rules and practices is via “rules of reference” that oblige states parties to 
abide by “generally accepted international rules and standards” (GAIRAS). The LOSC generally 
avoids detailing specific standards for oceans governance, leaving substantive regulation to 
rulemaking by competent international organizations instead. Though GAIRAS provide a 
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flexible mechanism to integrate new binding international rules, they are not necessarily suited to 
integrating entire new bodies of climate change-related international law with the LOSC. 
GAIRAS are only invoked in certain articles (rather than universally throughout the convention), 
limiting their efficacy to systematically integrate developing adaptation rules, and indeed, only a 
single climate change-focused GAIRAS appears to have emerged.147  
 The LOSC may also evolve through supplementary agreements, including via the two 
‘implementing’ agreements—the 1994 Agreement relating to Part XI and the 1995 UN Fish 
Stock Agreement.148 As Boyle notes, such agreements may interpret or develop existing LOSC 
provisions, and furthermore, “They also provide alternative models for what is in effect, although 
not in form, inter se amendment of the Convention”.149 Indeed, a supplementary or implementing 
agreement might be an effective avenue for the LOSC to develop in response to emerging 
climate law by either reforming parts of the LOSC or by laying out a framework to 
systematically address climate considerations throughout the convention. This possibility has 
garnered attention from both scholars and states. Dahl for instance has proposed a binding legal 
instrument containing measures for adapting aquaculture to climate change.150 Similarly, 
vulnerable island nations have discussed negotiating an agreement recognizing pre-sea level rise 
baselines as static to address climate change’s threat to maritime zone entitlements.151  
Such agreements may be impractical or ill-suited given the nature of climate change, 
however. A limited supplementary or implementing agreement effectively reforming just part of 
the LOSC may fail to address the full scope of climate change’s impact on the LOS. In addition, 
such agreements may fail to anticipate future problems, potentially locking states into sub-
optimal responses requiring repeat or multiple efforts by states parties to address subsequent 
climate change impacts. Furthermore, reaching expansive agreements intended to permit 
systematic consideration of climate change may be impractical, complicated by the complex 
political dilemmas inherent in climate negotiations. There indeed seems to be little interest from 
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states to negotiate a more expansive climate-focused implementing agreement, which would by 
nature necessitate codification of new climate change-focused rules and norms applicable to the 
LOSC. For instance, the UN General Assembly tasked the ILC with studying sea-level rise’s 
legal impact, but it restricted the ILC to working within the existing LOS rather than to codify 
new applicable climate norms and rules. Furthermore, the ILC’s work is focused on one aspect of 
climate change, thus excluding full examination of other climate impacts on the LOSC.152  
While these mechanisms seem ill-suited to facilitating the LOSC’s development in 
response to climate change, another mechanism may be more appropriate. The LOSC is not 
isolated from broader international law, and reinterpreting the convention considering climate 
law may permit the systematic consideration of adaptation needs throughout the convention. 
Systematic Interpretation and Systemic Integration of Climate Law 
The LOSC is not isolated from the broader international law. As Boyle emphasizes, the 
LOSC is not an entirely separate regime. “At numerous points it makes reference to rules of 
general international law or incorporates generally accepted international rules and standards 
derived mainly from other treaties”.153 Indeed, the LOSC’s interfacing with other agreements 
allows it to evolve beyond the convention’s original scope—a process informed by rules of treaty 
interpretation. Boyle notes, “[the LOSC] must also be interpreted and applied in accordance with 
the normal rules of treaty law, including those which allow other agreements and rules of 
international law to be taken into account for this purpose.”154  
Indeed, systematic interpretation provides a significant but less defined evolutionary 
pathway by which the LOSC may evolve in response to developing adaptation rules. This 
process is informed by the convention text, climate change law, and rules of treaty interpretation. 
Jakobsen et al. emphasize the importance of interpretation to the development of the LOSC. 
First, systemic interpretation of the relevant instruments in light of new practice and changing 
circumstances is an important task for scholars. Through their work, dynamic interpretation 
of the LOSC may be developed and the relevant regulations and instruments may be 
interpreted and read together, in a way that creates linkages between the different regimes.155 
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Generally, rules of treaty interpretation indicate that subsequent rules of international law are 
assumed to be generally compatible with existing law.156 In this case, however, the LOSC and 
international climate law (as embodied in the UNFCCC and its related instruments) both bear on 
managing climate change’s adverse effects on the oceans.   
In studying the fragmentation of international law, including the development of 
specified regimes with overlapping rules or norms, the ILC wrote, “In applying international law, 
it is often necessary to determine the precise relationship when two or more rules and principles 
that are both valid and applicable in respect of a situation.” To do so, the ILC emphasized the 
importance of rules of treaty interpretation outlined in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).157 In particular, Article 31 of the VCLT enumerates that 
interpretation of a convention should consider its object and purpose, subsequent agreement or 
practice, and relevant rules of law applicable between the parties.158 
Article 31(1) states, “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose”.159 While interpretation begins with the “ordinary meaning” of the treaty’s 
text, it must also consider the treaty’s “object and purpose.” The purpose of a convention cannot 
override its text, but its terms should be interpreted in a manner furthering the convention’s 
overall aims.160 In this case, the LOSC’s aims include addressing future issues, which seems to 
clearly include climate change.161 As such, emerging climate change-related norms and rules, 
including those related to adaptation, seem significant to interpreting the terms of the LOSC.  
Similarly, Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT indicates that treaty interpretation should 
consider “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties”.162 Harrison writes of Article 31(3)(c), “This provision promotes the systemic integration 
of a treaty with other sources of international law. It also allows a court or tribunal to take into 
account changes in international law, policy or values which may influence the interpretation of 
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a treaty”.163 Indeed, the principle of systemic integration is embodied in Article 31(3)(c), which 
as explained by McLachlan, asserts that all treaties are products of international law and must 
thus be applied and interpreted in light of general international legal principles.164 In the NATO 
Bombing Case for instance, the European Court of Human Rights ruled, “The [European 
Convention for Human Rights] should be interpreted as far as possible in harmony with other 
principles of international law of which it forms part”.165 This principle helps to avert conflicts of 
norms and achieve harmonization between rules of international law, particularly those coming 
from disparate special areas of law.166 Generally, where different norms or rules apply to a single 
issue, they should be interpreted so as to give rise one set of compatible obligations.167  
Given that the LOSC is evolutionary in nature, providing a framework to address future 
issues in the law of the sea, it should be interpreted in a manner that permits the systemic 
integration of the adaptation regime.168 Harrison writes of Article 31(3)(c), “This provision 
promotes the systemic integration of a treaty with other sources of international law. It also 
allows a court or tribunal to take into account changes in international law, policy or values 
which may influence the interpretation of a treaty”.169 Indeed, courts and tribunals have 
supported evolutionary interpretation, indicating the importance of international law and custom 
to the interpretation of the LOSC. As the tribunal noted in South China Sea Arbitration, the 
content of coastal states’ obligations under the convention is informed by “other applicable rules 
of international law”.170 Similarly, in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros judgment, the ICJ noted the 
need to consider and give weight to new norms and standards in international law.171  
The relevance of Article 31(3)(c) is not limited to interpreting treaties in light of climate 
law. The article also entails interpreting treaties considering rules found in other treaties, which 
in this case, would specifically include climate adaptation obligations enumerated in later climate 
change agreements. Such rules are particularly relevant where the parties of two treaties overlap, 
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and the UNFCCC has virtually universal membership.172 That adaptation obligations are open 
and evolving is also significant to interpreting the LOSC. The ILC writes,  
Rules of international law subsequent to the treaty to be interpreted may be taken into 
account especially where the concepts used in the treaty are open or evolving. This is the 
case, in particular, where […] the concept is one which implies taking into account 
subsequent technical, economic or legal developments[, or] the concept sets up an obligation 
for further progressive development for the parties.173 
The adaptation regime is still emerging, and adaptation must by nature consider future 
developments in human (and ecological) systems. Furthermore, the Paris Agreement requires 
adaptation actions to be progressive, so the regime will develop as climate change intensifies.174 
Not only does Article 31(3)(c) hold developing climate rules as significant to interpreting the 
LOSC, but the LOSC should be interpreted considering obligations found in climate treaties. 
Assessing Possible Conflicts between Adaptation Obligations and the Law of the Sea 
Systematic interpretation of the LOSC indicates that climate law, including adaptation 
rules, applies to the convention where there is no conflict. However, there may also be cases 
where the LOSC conflicts with states’ adaptation obligations. For example, land reclamation and 
artificial coastal defenses might be critical to safeguarding vulnerable coastal communities, but 
such measures can have severe negative environmental externalities. Given the potential 
violation of states’ obligations to protect and preserve the marine environment, the LOSC might 
hold those coastal defensive measures as unlawful, thus precluding states from important 
adaptation tools. Where the LOSC seems incapable of balancing conflicting norms and 
obligations, systematic interpretation of the LOSC applying customary interpretive rules 
indicates that adaptation obligations may be applicable even where conflicting with the LOSC.   
The ILC notes the maxim lex specialis derogare lege generali as international custom in 
interpreting conflicting international law. The lex specialis rule suggests that, when two or more 
norms apply to a subject, interpreters should give priority to the more specific.175 This can help 
to apply, clarify, update, or set aside general international law in ways that often better accounts 
for the specific context of the issue at hand. But the lex specialis rule is most helpful in 
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differentiating between general rules and specific rules; in this case, both the law of the sea and 
international climate law arguably provide rules for an overlapping issue area.176 While the LOS 
regime has indeed been referred to as a self-contained legal regime, it has never served as lex 
specialis regarding environmental issues. As Boyle notes,  
Can it plausibly be claimed that the LOSC regulates climate impacts on the oceans in 
splendid isolation from the Paris Agreement? Other marine pollution agreements provide the 
evolutionary content for Part XII obligations, including the 1973/78 MARPOL Convention 
and the London Dumping Convention. Why should the Paris Agreement be different?177 
Indeed, neither the LOSC nor international climate law, including adaptation obligations, should 
exclude consideration of other law regarding climate change’s impacts on oceans governance. 
 The lex posterior rule may also be significant to deciphering conflicts between the LOSC 
and climate law. Under the rule lex posterior derogate legi priori, Article 30(3) holds that the 
earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its terms are compatible with those of the later.178 The 
UNFCCC and the LOSC overlap in relating to climate change’s effects on the oceans, and 
Article 30 applies to the application of successive treaties relating to the same subject matter. 
The UNFCCC is a later treaty than the LOSC, and it has virtually universal membership. As 
such, the lex posterior rule indicates that the UNFCCC would apply to ocean governance issues 
relating to climate change over the LOSC. As the ILC notes, however, the lex posterior principle 
is strongest regarding overlapping or conflicting provisions in treaties either institutionally linked 
or part of the same regime. While UNFCCC and the LOSC intersect relating to climate change’s 
adverse effects on the oceans, they focus on separate regimes. The ILC writes,  
In cases of conflicts or overlaps between treaties in different regimes, the question of which 
of them is later in time would not necessarily express any presumption of priority between 
them. Instead, States bound by the treaty obligations should try to implement them as far as 
possible with the view of mutual accommodation and in accordance with the principle of 
harmonization.179  
Where no conflict between the UNFCCC and the LOSC exist, climate treaty obligations should 
be considered applicable; however, neither the lex specialis nor the lex posterior rules adequately 
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address questions of conflicting obligations and norms. Further analysis of the LOSC, however, 
arguably supports interpretation in light of adaptation obligations even where they conflict.  
Conflict clauses are important to assigning priority to conflicting treaty rules and 
norms.180 The UNFCCC and its related agreements do not include conflict clauses, instead 
referring disputes to non-binding conciliation or compulsory ICJ jurisdiction and arbitration.181 
The LOSC, on the other hand, does include specific conflict clauses relating to potential conflicts 
with other agreements and conventions. These conflict clauses are not, however, conclusive in 
understanding conflicting LOSC and adaptation obligations.   
LOSC Article 237 relates specifically to the relationship of the LOSC with other 
conventions on the protection and preservation of the marine environment.182 Though Article 237 
has allowed the LOSC to consider entire new legal regimes such as the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, it is not necessarily applicable to the full scope of international climate change 
agreements. The objective of climate action is enumerated in Article 2 of the UNFCCC:  
…[S]tabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should 
be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate 
change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development 
to proceed in a sustainable manner.183  
In other words, the focus of international climate action is to slow climate change to give both 
ecosystems and societies the time needed to adapt to its impacts. While climate agreements are 
certainly critical to the protection and preservation of the environment, central to international 
climate action is averting climate threats to human security and wellbeing. As much of the 
UNFCCC regime focuses on issues other than environmental protection, Article 237 is not 
relevant to significant parts of international climate law.  
LOSC Article 311, governing the relationship between the LOSC and other international 
agreements, provides for a similarly uneven application of climate law to the LOSC. It permits 
other agreements so long as they are compatible with the convention and do not negatively affect 
states’ LOSC rights and duties. Article 311 indicates LOSC’s superiority in direct conflicts with 
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climate instruments altering the LOSC’s terms. But as Redgwell notes, “Although this might be 
one possible outcome with respect to addressing baseline or maritime delimitation issues, it is far 
less likely to occur in the context of measures for the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment from the adverse effects of climate change.184 In practice, however, Article 311 may 
not conclusively assign the LOSC superiority in conflicts with developing climate law.     
The LOSC consistently indicates disputes under the convention remain subject to broader 
international law, and the question of superiority ascribed to the LOSC under Article 311 also 
arises under Article 293. Article 293 indicates applicable law for dispute settlement, instructing 
courts and tribunals to apply “other rules of international law” applicable between the parties in 
addition to the convention text itself.185 Importantly, through rulings and legal guidance, this 
permits courts and tribunals to effectively update the practical application of the LOSC to ensure 
that the convention continues to settle all issues relating to the law of the sea.186 Though opening 
the convention to developments outside of the LOSC, Article 293 also requires that applicable 
international law be “not incompatible with the convention,” indicating the superiority of the 
convention in matters of judicial interpretation. Article 293 meanwhile has never prevented the 
direct modernization of the LOS regime. For example, the FSA directly alters states parties Part 
XI duties and obligations, so a strict interpretation of Article 293—and arguably Article 311—
might prevent it from consideration as applicable law. As Harrison notes, a court or tribunal not 
considering the FSA applicable law is inconceivable.187  
Additional rules of treaty interpretation support the case that adaptation rules are 
applicable despite conflicts with (and conflict clauses within) the LOSC. For instance, states 
have a right under general international law, recognized by courts, to modify agreements through 
subsequent practice, even where conflicting with conflict clauses.188 In the Namibia Advisory 
Opinion, the ICJ found that practice could modify the UN Charter despite a conflict clause 
declaring it superior to any conflicting agreements or obligations. The ICJ stated, “… 
[I]nterpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent development of law, through the 
Charter of the United Nations and by way of customary international law”.189 In the Iron Rhine 
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Railway Arbitration, the Court supported evolutionary interpretation in light of a treaty’s original 
intent and new technical developments that impacted the practical reality of the treaty.190 Treaty 
intent and changing circumstances are significant to treaty interpretation. Articles 293 and 311 
should not be understood to hamper the role of developing international rules in the 
interpretation of the LOSC, and courts and tribunals may recognize developing adaptation 
obligations even when incompatible.  
Chapter IV: Integrating Adaptation Obligations in the LOSC  
This thesis holds that states are obliged under climate law to both adapt to climate change 
and to cooperate in facilitating international adaptation. Systematic treaty interpretation indicates 
that these obligations apply to the LOSC where they don’t conflict, and maybe even where they 
do. Where and how, then, might those obligations intersect with the LOSC? The LOSC organizes 
the oceans into maritime zones within which it accords certain rights and duties according to 
states’ status as a coastal, flag, or port state and the types of activities undertaken. Independent of 
specific LOSC articles, adaptation obligations are significant to the interpretation and application 
of the entire convention. However, certain LOSC articles relating to states’ zonal and sectoral 
rights and duties lend themselves more clearly to reinterpretation considering emerging 
international climate rules. This chapter is not intended to address every circumstance where 
adaptation obligations intersect with states’ LOSC rights and duties. Rather, in identifying some 
likely points of interface, its purpose is to explore the adaptation regime’s legal significance. 
Indeed, interpreting the LOSC considering adaptation obligations may provide a framework for 
interpreting and settling climate change-related legal issues in the law of the sea. 
Adaptation Obligations and Baseline Issues under the LOSC 
Perhaps the most discussed climate-related problem in the LOS regime is the 
“ambulatory baselines” issue. The LOSC provides for coastal state jurisdictional and economic 
rights in offshore maritime zones like the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The 
breadth of these zones depends on baselines drawn along coastlines, often based on points of low 
tide elevation. The LOSC tacitly assumes the general stationarity of these baselines, so it largely 
fails to consider climate change-related coastline reconfiguration. As coastlines shift landward, 
 
190 See Award in the Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine Railway (Kingdom of Belgium/Kingdom of the Netherlands) (Iron 
Rhine Arbitration), 24 May 2005, Reports of International /Arbitral Awards, Vol. XXVII pp. 35- 125, pp. 73-74 [80-81].; see 
also Harrison (2008).  
 37 
do these baselines “ambulate” in parallel? The answer is not obvious in the LOSC, but the 
possible effects may be profound. Landward shifts in baselines can move or shrink maritime 
zone entitlements, effectively depriving coastal states of areas to exercise exclusive economic 
rights (fishing, energy exploration, aquaculture, etc.) upon which they formerly depended. The 
LOSC does not explicitly require that maritime boundaries shift with baselines, but coastal state 
zone entitlements generally depend on land territory.191 Notably, the VCLT excludes treaties that 
establish boundaries (including maritime zones established under the LOSC) from invocations of 
“fundamental changes of circumstances,” which would include shifts in basepoints.192 
Legal scholars have for decades contributed to a significant debate over sea-level rise’s 
impact on baselines and legal approaches to addressing the issue.193 The ILA Committee on 
Baselines indicated in 2012 that the LOSC’s provisions on baselines do not provide an adequate 
solution to sea-level rise, but other scholars have explored alternative arguments.194 As Busch 
explains, there are two primary approaches to minimizing the legal consequences of the baselines 
issue. The first is simply to treat baselines as permanent so that, while internal waters may grow, 
maritime zone entitlements do not shrink. The second approach is to maintain the existing outer 
limits of maritime zones, even when the baseline retracts.195 Both of these approaches might be 
contrary to the interests of flag states, which would presumably gain from the growth of global 
commons associated with entitlement losses by coastal states.  
The ILA sea-level rise committee on International Law explored procedural options for 
securing maritime entitlements but decided against specific proposals.196 Indeed, as Busch notes,  
While a relatively unanimous community of legal scholars seems to agree that the way to 
approach climate-change challenges to maritime limits is to freeze the baselines and 
boundaries established under the LOSC, they are unable to agree on the procedure for 
effectuating such modification or expansion of the LOSC.197 
Exploration of these procedural options has largely failed to consider states’ national and general 
cooperative climate adaptation obligations, however. Customary rules of treaty interpretation 
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indicate that, where multiple norms are relevant to a topic, they should be interpreted so as to 
contribute to a single set of harmonious rules and obligations compatible across regimes.198 As 
such, LOSC interpretation should consider and support states’ national and cooperative 
adaptation obligations, allowing vulnerable coastal states to secure maritime zone entitlements 
(and their associated resources). This may reduce the vulnerability and increase the resilience of 
coastal human and environmental systems to climate impacts in line with adaptation goals. 
Interpretation of the convention in this could support multiple procedures indicated by other 
authors to secure maritime entitlements. For instance, considering adaptation obligations would 
encourage a more expansive interpretation of the LOSC’s baselines provisions, perhaps 
supporting the case for permitting coastal states to establish normal baselines around unstable 
coastlines as outlined in Article 7(2) of the LOSC.199  
 Interpretation permitting the securing of baselines against climate change may not 
address climate degradation of islands, however. The LOSC sets forth a specific legal regime for 
islands, which courts have further detailed.200 Islands must generally be habitable to be afforded 
maritime zone entitlements, which is problematic when climate change can negatively impact 
island habitability. Even if climate change fails to inflict significant territorial losses to islands, 
saltwater infiltration from rising sea levels can endanger the freshwater sources commonly used 
as a marker of habitability. If an island fully submerges or becomes otherwise uninhabitable, it 
might become an offshore feature incapable of generating maritime zones. In this light, 
interpreting the LOSC considering states’ adaptation obligations might also support interpreting 
the LOSC in a manner that holds maritime zones’ outer limits as fixed, such as by basing them 
on boundaries established by published charts deposited with the UN Secretary-General.201  
 In some cases, climate impacts may be so severe as to cause total territorial loss for entire 
nations, compelling the migration of their inhabitants. Deprived of territory and population, these 
states would no longer fulfill the fundamental requirements for state sovereignty, potentially 
precluding them from international recognition and of rights afforded to them as states under the 
LOS regime.202 Schofield and Freestone note that states may physically reinforce an existing 
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island to maintain its territorial status under Article 60 of the LOSC.203 Similarly, the LOSC’s 
island regime requires that a feature be capable of sustaining human habitation to be considered 
an island, which might arguably be fulfilled by previous habitability.204 In that vein, the LOSC 
may be interpreted as permitting the physical reinforcement of a formerly habitable island to 
secure maritime entitlements. More expansive interpretation in this manner could support states’ 
fulfillment of their climate obligations by permitting displaced nations and de-territorialized 
states to secure resources from previous maritime zone entitlements.   
 Coastal communities are constructing natural and artificial coastal defenses in response to 
sea-level rise, the increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather, and corresponding 
increases in flooding dangers. Some such measures appear compatible with the LOSC, but others 
are subject to more uncertainty, particularly where they impact baselines and zone entitlements. 
While integral harbor works are explicitly legal and afforded weight in drawing baselines, other 
adaptation measures might.205 A levee or seawall system far from any harbor cannot be 
considered ‘integral harbor works,’ nor would land reclamation measures. Nevertheless, such 
measures may be important to averting coastal climate impacts, contributing to the fulfillment of 
adaptation obligations.206 The ILA found that, though normal baselines are ambulatory, coastal 
protection and land reclamation projects may be considered part of the coast, thus impacting 
basepoints.207 As Oral notes, coastal protection measures’ impact on baselines has proven an 
abundant state practice seemingly approved by international courts. In the Black Sea Case, for 
instance, the ICJ concluded that the Sulina Dyke was an acceptable territorial sea basepoint.208  
 Where severely threatened, states may elect to construct artificial islands as adaptation 
measures, and indeed, the Maldives has already begun.209 The LOSC indicates that artificial 
islands, while broadly permissible, are not entitled to any maritime zones.210 In exploring the 
legality of artificial islands as an adaptation measure, Oral notes that while the LOSC requires 
that islands be naturally formed, it does not explicitly require that condition to apply at all stages, 
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nor does it clarify whether a naturally formed feature may be reinforced into an island.211 The 
tribunal emphasized in the South China Sea Arbitration that islands must have natural capacity to 
sustain human habitation, so entirely artificial constructions cannot qualify as islands. However, 
the LOSC might arguably permit zone entitlements by artificial islands constructed upon features 
that qualified as natural islands prior to climate change. History is relevant to judging the 
habitability of features, and the Tribunal noted the importance of considering features 
considering external forces contributing to their depopulation, which would certainly include 
climate change. Given that the purpose of the island regime is to prevent excessive maritime 
zone claims, evidence of habitation predating the LOSC is also significant a significant factor.212 
Adaptation Obligations and Rights and Duties in Maritime Zones under the LOSC 
Many rights and duties under the LOSC apply independently from the LOSC’s zonal 
architecture. For example, Part XII environmental duties apply regardless of zone, as do general 
legal rules like the prohibition on transboundary harm.213 However, climate change does 
particularly strain the LOSC’s zonal approach. Vidas et al. note that the LOSC’s reliance on 
zones is problematic given that climate change’s effects are neither dependent on nor limited by 
borders: “In this respect, climate change may present a serious challenge to the sustainability of 
the current structure of the law of the sea”.214 As such, it is important to consider climate rules 
developing beyond the LOSC. As held in the Chagos Maritime Protected Area arbitration,  
[… The] Tribunal notes that each of the territorial sea, international straits, the exclusive 
economic zone, the continental shelf and the high seas includes a provision to the effect that 
States will exercise their rights under the Convention subject to, or with regard to, the rights 
and duties of other States or rules of international law beyond the Convention itself.215 
Climate rules, including adaptation obligations, are relevant to states’ zonal rights and duties, and 
their integration may further the LOSC’s zonal structure’s evolution considering climate change.  
 The general provisions regarding the status of the territorial sea, which extends up to 
12nm from coastal state baselines, holds that coastal states’ exercise of sovereignty is subject to 
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“other rules of international law”.216 Such rules apply also to the exercise of sovereignty or 
jurisdiction over international straits within their territorial seas, as well as to regulations for 
navigation through their territorial waters.217 Similarly, flag states’ limited rights in other states’ 
territorial waters, including rights of innocent passage and transit passage, must also conform 
with “other rules of international law”.218 The exact meaning of “other rules of international law” 
is not defined in the LOSC, and states have disputed whether it constitutes a binding limit on a 
state’s rights or duties under the convention by external international obligations.219 This issue 
was raised in the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration in the context of LOSC Article 2(3) 
relating to sovereignty over the territorial sea. The Arbitral Tribunal found that such language did 
reflect an obligation to consider non-LOSC bodies of law and that states’ rights in maritime 
zones under the Convention are generally impacted by general rules of international law beyond 
the LOSC.220 As such, both coastal and flag state rights and obligations in the territorial sea 
should be exercised and fulfilled considering national and cooperative adaptation obligations. 
Developing climate change-related rules of international law, including adaptation 
obligations, are also relevant to coastal and flag states’ rights and duties in the EEZ. Article 58(3) 
relating to flag states’ rights in the EEZ indicates that non-coastal states must exercise their 
rights and perform their duties according to “other rules of international law” not incompatible 
with the convention. The article further obliges non-coastal states to have “due regard” to the 
rights and duties of the coastal state.221 In parallel, Article 56(2) enumerates that coastal states’ 
exercise and performance of rights and duties in the EEZ must have “due regard” to other states’ 
rights and duties.222 The full and exact meaning of the duty of “due regard” is not fully apparent 
in the LOSC; however, duties of due regard arguably require consideration of states’ adaptation 
obligations as well as the international community’s interest in climate action. Forteau argues 
that the purpose of this language is to ensure conciliation between concurrent and overlapping 
rights and obligations, including those derived from external international law.223 Similarly, 
Gaunce has found rights and duties within the scope of the duty of due regard to have included 
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external obligations. Gaunce further concludes that the duty of due regard is not only a bilateral 
obligation between coastal and flag states but also a duty to the interests of the international 
community—which may include global ecological interests such as climate change mitigation.224 
Given that the international community has given adaptation equal priority with mitigation, 
climate adaptation seems an international interest for which states should give due regard.225  
 States’ rights and duties in high seas beyond the EEZ appear subject to international legal 
obligations external to the LOSC. Article 87 outlines general freedoms of the high seas, such as 
freedoms of navigation and overflight. Paragraph 1 explicitly holds that these freedoms are to be 
exercised under the conditions laid down by “other rules of international law”.226 As such, states’ 
exercise of high seas freedoms should be considered subject to both national and cooperative 
adaptation obligations under international climate law. Furthermore, Paragraph 2 indicates that 
high seas freedoms shall be exercised according to states’ duties of due regard, which as just 
argued should consider other states’ and the international community’s adaptation interests and 
obligations.227 And while states have no rights to sovereignty over the Area or its resources, the 
LOSC indicates that general conduct in the Area is to follow other rules of international law. 
 Compared to other zones, international obligations appear less significant to specified 
coastal and flag states’ rights and duties on the continental shelf and within internal waters. 
Under the LOSC, states have sovereign jurisdiction over the internal waters within baselines as 
part of their sovereign territory.228 Whether internal waters are subject to the LOSC at all, or 
whether they fall solely under domestic law, is debated, but the convention does not appear to 
attach specific restrictions to coastal state sovereignty over internal waters.229 Similarly, coastal 
state sovereignty over the continental shelf is an extension of that state’s land territory rather 
than dependent on express proclamation under the convention.230 Coastal states have rights to 
natural resource exploitation on the continental shelf that are limited by an obligation not to 
unjustifiably interfere with other states’ rights and freedoms under the LOSC. The adaptation 
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regime is not limited by geographic scope, however, so where the LOSC is silent or not clearly 
applicable, states are still bound by their obligations under international law.231 
Continental shelves may underlie EEZs and the high seas, making relevant other states’ 
rights in those associated regimes. As discussed, states’ rights and obligations in the EEZ and 
high seas water columns may be informed by international adaptation obligations external to the 
LOSC. Exercise of coastal state continental shelf rights must also consider “rights and freedoms 
of other States as provided for in this Convention”.232 International adaptation obligations are not 
rights or freedoms, and as they derive from sources of law external to the LOSC, they are not 
necessarily provided for in the LOSC. However, interpreting national and cooperative adaptation 
obligations as of erga omnes character could provide a line of reasoning holding that the 
international community has, collectively, an inverse right to adaptation. This could be 
considered an unarticulated right provided for by LOSC Articles 58 and 87(1) referencing 
broader international rights and obligations in the EEZ and the high seas.233  
Adaptation Obligations and Environmental Duties under the LOSC 
Integral to the objective of international climate action is facilitating natural adaptation of 
ecosystems to protect human security.234 Climate change, though significantly impacting human 
systems, is at its core an environmental problem, making relevant the LOSC’s articles on the 
marine environment. Part XII of the LOSC sets forth a framework for the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment, both enumerating its own requirements and applying 
rules developed elsewhere. Notably, these environmental duties apply to all States both within 
and beyond national jurisdiction, and they seem clearly affected by adaptation considerations.235  
The LOSC’s environmental obligations focus on the “protection” and “preservation” of 
the marine environment. Neither term is superior, and the Arbitral Tribunal defined them both in 
the South China Sea Arbitration. “Protection” involves protecting against future harm, and 
indeed, adaptation measures aim in part to decrease vulnerability to future climate impacts.236 
The Paris Agreement explicitly finds adaptation as key to protecting ecosystems from negative 
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future climate impacts.237 “Preservation” entails maintaining or improving an ecosystem’s 
current condition.238 As such, adaptation measures might be considered as improving marine 
ecosystems by increasing resiliency to ongoing climate impacts. “Preservation” should not be 
interpreted to entail averting all climate impacts on marine ecosystems. Climate change can alter 
ecological conditions and redistribute species; however, environmental change is not inherently 
damaging, so efforts to promote in situ “preservation” may be counterproductive to the marine 
environment’s new basic state. Indeed, Ruhl has noted that, within environmental law, climate 
change adaptation is accelerating a shift from in situ preservation towards transitional and 
adaptive management approaches.239 Johansen and Henriksen have also noted the importance of 
adaptive management considering climate change, which emphasizes flexible responses to new 
environmental information. “Adaptation to the impacts of climate change requires a legal regime 
that is able to respond quickly to changes”.240 Adopting adaptive environmental governance 
might thus fulfill both developing adaptation obligations and LOSC environmental duties.  
Other scholars have also noted the significance of climate change to LOSC duties to the 
marine environment. Boyle, for instance, also finds that Part XII obliges states to protect the 
marine environment from climate impacts; however, his analysis is grounded in Part XII’s 
pollution control measures, understanding mitigation contributions under the Paris Agreement as 
GAIRAS for protecting the marine environment. Boyle finds adaptation’s relevance to the LOSC 
to be less clear, and he fails to recognize or explore any adaptation obligations under climate law 
instruments. While he acknowledges that the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement both hold 
adaptation as important to global climate efforts, he understates the significance of the adaptation 
regime.241 The Paris Agreement not only gives adaptation equal priority to mitigation, but it 
explicitly recognizes adaptation as key to the long-term global response to protect ecosystems.242  
While the adaptation regime does not detail adaptation obligations with the precision 
perhaps necessary to be considered GAIRAS for regulatory purposes, developing adaptation 
rules seem critical to states’ environmental obligations given climate change’s significant 
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environmental implications.243 Article 192 establishes a general duty to protect and preserve the 
marine environment, which according to Jakobsen, may require climate adaptation measures. 
…[I]t is reasonable to argue that the duty to protect the marine environment and to protect 
and conserve marine biological diversity also includes a duty to take mitigation and 
adaptation measures as a response to the effects of climate change.244 
According to the tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration, Article 192 is informed by rules of 
international law and may be violated by failing to actively protect and preserve the 
environment.245 Indeed, Article 192 includes a due diligence requirement entailing measures to 
protect the marine environment from future threats, which might thus require adaptation.246  
The LOSC and climate law both hold cooperation important to the environment. Craig notes,  
With regard to climate change adaptation at the international level, the UNFCCC and its 
protocols most clearly create a duty for the world’s nations to cooperate. Given the global 
nature of the ocean, this duty to cooperate will be especially important to ocean adaptation, 
particularly in terms of dealing with climate change impacts to individual marine species, 
marine biodiversity, and wild capture fisheries.247 
The UNFCCC Article 4(1)(e) obliges states to cooperate to facilitate international adaptation, 
including through “appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone management,” and Article 5 
of the Paris Agreement also requires parties to conserve and enhance reservoirs of greenhouse 
gasses, including coastal and marine ecosystems.248 As Jakobsen argues, climate change-
inclusive interpretation of states’ environmental obligations under the LOSC reinforces the 
imprecise obligations found in climate treaties. She further indicates that marine protected areas 
may constitute measures appropriate to fulfilling both cooperative adaptation obligations and 
LOSC environmental duties.249 The LOSC enumerates similar duties for states to cooperate in 
formulating standards and practices for managing the marine environment.250 The tribunal 
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clarified in the South China Sea Arbitration that this obligation is general rather than for specific 
rulemaking.251 Considering adaptation needs—and that adaptation is important to protecting the 
marine environment in light of climate change—Article 197’s general obligations to cooperate 
arguably supports states’ cooperative obligations under international adaptation law.252 
In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, the tribunal held that the conservation of living 
resources is an element of protecting and preserving the marine environment.253 As such, states 
should consider adaptation obligations in the management of living resources. Article 61 of the 
LOSC relates to the conservation of the living resources in the EEZ, while Article 119 focuses 
on the conservation of living resources of the high seas.254 Each article requires states to consider 
scientific evidence, which Molenaar finds might oblige states to consider adaptation. “Arguably, 
a qualified obligation on climate-change adaptation can to some extent be derived from the 
qualified obligation relating to ‘best scientific evidence available’ laid down in LOSC Articles 
61(2) and 119(1)(a)”.255 Similarly, regional fisheries management organizations should arguably 
consider adaptation needs according to UN General Assembly resolutions.256  
While adaptation obligations should be considered integral to the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment under the LOSC, environmental duties must at times be 
balanced against human interests. In the South China Sea Arbitration for instance, the tribunal 
found that China’s artificial island construction and land reclamation efforts violated its 
environmental obligations.257 As discussed earlier, however, the systematic interpretation of the 
LOSC indicates that states’ adaptation obligations are applicable even where they conflict with 
the LOSC. As such, states have a right to coastal adaptation measures even where they have 
negative environmental externalities. In Land Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the 
Straits of Johor, ITLOS permitted Singapore to continue land reclamation, and while directing 
Singapore to avoid serious harm, it permitted the activity despite possibly inevitable adverse 
environmental impacts. It did however note the importance of prudence and caution, indicating a 
need for states to consider environmental externalities when planning coastal defenses.258 Where 
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the interests of human and ecological systems conflict, adaptation obligations must be balanced 
noting the central aim of adaptation efforts, which is the safeguarding of human security.259   
Adaptation Obligations and Scientific Cooperation under the LOSC 
 Some of the more detailed aspects of the adaptation regime relate to science and 
information sharing. For instance, the Paris Agreement emphasizes the centrality of scientific 
knowledge to climate action. To further global adaptation, particularly to assist developing 
countries, it calls on states to share scientific information and best practices, to strengthen 
institutional arrangements that synthesize adaptation information and spread technical guidance, 
and to expand knowledge to inform adaptation decision-making.260 To spread scientific and 
technical information and guidance, the COP set up the Adaptation Committee, which oversaw 
the cooperation-promoting Technical Process on Adaptation.261 Additionally, the COP organized 
the Nairobi Work Programme, a knowledge-to-action hub facilitating international adaptation 
knowledge sharing.262 Importantly, the Paris Agreement’s scientific cooperation obligations are 
general duties arguably applicable beyond these COP initiatives, and they correspond neatly with 
the LOSC’s articles on marine scientific research and environmental monitoring.  
While marine scientific research (MSR) is not defined by the LOSC, it may include 
scientific studies or experiments designed to increase mankind’s knowledge of the marine 
environment.263 As such, studies relating to climate impacts on the marine environment, which 
are important to coastal adaptation decision-making, likely qualify as MSR. The LOSC’s MSR 
provisions include articles on international cooperation, including via international organizations. 
For instance, Article 242 enumerates a qualified obligation for states to promote cooperation in 
MSR, including by providing appropriate and reasonable opportunities for other States to learn 
from that research.264 Similarly, Article 244 holds that states and competent international 
organizations shall appropriately publish and disseminate knowledge relating to MSR and shall 
also promote the flow of scientific knowledge, particularly to developing states.265  
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 LOSC Part XII’s technical assistance and environmental monitoring sections also appear 
relevant to states’ adaptation obligations. Articles 204-206 oblige states to endeavor to study the 
risks or effects of pollution of the marine environment, and especially to monitor the effects of 
any activities they permit that may be likely to pollute the marine environment. Other authors 
have argued that carbon emissions resulting in negative effects on the oceans, including ocean 
acidification, may constitute pollution of the marine environment as defined under the LOSC.266 
As such, states, especially industrial emitters of greenhouse gasses, may be obliged to study 
climate change’s impacts on the oceans and to report that information to international institutions 
to share more broadly.267 Article 202 also indicates that states should promote technical and 
scientific assistance to developing states, particularly relating to the protection and preservation 
of the marine environment, which this thesis argues must consider climate change.268  
Scientific information is essential to adaptation decision-making, and states are under 
both a national obligation to adapt and a general obligation to cooperate in facilitating adaptation. 
The LOSC’s articles relating to international cooperation on MSR, technical assistance to 
developing states for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, and 
environmental monitoring and assessment should be reinterpreted considering those needs and 
obligations. In an adaptation context, the referenced LOSC articles might support the case that 
states should share relevant marine climate research with other states—including and perhaps 
especially via the adaptation knowledge-sharing institutions set up under the UNFCCC.  
Adaptation Obligations and Dispute Settlement under the LOSC 
 Climate change is a significant issue to the interpretation and application of the LOSC, 
whether relating to the treaty’s architecture (including “ambulatory” baselines) or regarding 
states’ enumerated rights and duties. As such, climate-related issues appear subject to the LOSC 
articles setting forth a regime to settle disputes relating to the interpretation and application of 
the convention.269 LOSC dispute settlement generally falls within Part XV, which lays out 
conflict resolution options for states parties. Though free to settle disputes through any agreed-
upon means, states parties may refer disputes to compulsory procedures through the ICJ, ITLOS, 
ad hoc arbitration under Annex VII, or special arbitration under Annex VIII. Where states do not 
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indicate a preference or differ in choice of forum, they default to Annex VII ad hoc arbitration 
unless otherwise agreed.270 Dispute settlement procedures under other treaties may prevail over 
Part XV in some instances, and certain disputes fall beyond the jurisdiction of LOSC courts or 
tribunals, such as those relating to military activities, historic title, or boundary delimitation.271  
 States may settle disputes peacefully outside the LOSC, and Article 281 indicates that 
Part XV procedures apply only where settlement through other means fails and where other 
treaties do not exclude the application of LOSC dispute settlement mechanisms.272 A question 
then is whether the UNFCCC’s dispute settlement option constitutes an alternative means of 
dispute settlement excluding settlement under the LOSC. In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, the 
tribunal concluded that Article 281 requires a clear statement explicitly opting out of Part XV 
dispute settlement or further procedures.273 Given that the UNFCCC does not explicitly exclude 
LOSC dispute settlement, Article 281 does not preclude states parties from seeking compulsory 
dispute settlement under the LOSC.274 Similarly, Article 282 permits states parties to seek 
binding dispute settlement under other agreements to which both states are parties.275 While the 
UNFCCC does have a dispute settlement mechanism, its non-binding nature excludes it from 
Article 282.276 Indeed, climate-related issues are not excluded from LOSC dispute settlement.  
Climate issues in the LOS appear subject to and not excluded from dispute settlement 
under the LOSC. Furthermore, courts and tribunals must consider states’ adaptation obligations 
in settling disputes. Indeed, Article 293 instructs courts and tribunals to apply not only the 
convention text but also “other rules of international law not incompatible” with the LOSC.277 In 
this case, it should be understood as instructing courts and tribunals to interpret the LOSC in 
light of developing climate change-related rules of international law. This thesis holds that states’ 
national and cooperative adaptation obligations, while relatively imprecise, are legally binding 
duties constituting “other rules of international law” relevant to LOSC dispute settlement.  
 Scholars have explored the potential for applying LOSC dispute settlement provisions to 
enforce states’ climate obligations, but they generally focus on mitigation. For instance, some 
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have argued that greenhouse gas emissions may fit the LOSC’s definition of marine pollution, 
and so failure to mitigate climate change violates states parties’ Article 192 obligations to protect 
and preserve the marine environment.278 However, adaptation is also critical to protecting 
ecosystems against climate impacts, and failures to adapt ecological systems arguably also 
violate states parties’ Article 192 obligations. As such, the LOSC dispute settlement seems 
equally applicable to adaptation. In any case, Lee and Bautista raise critical issues regarding 
application of LOSC dispute settlement to failures to fulfill international climate obligations. 
Who can bring such a claim, and against what countries could such a claim be brought? What 
is the likelihood of such a claim? What would be the implications of such a claim for the 
climate change regime and international relations more generally? To what standard would a 
Party be held?279 
While raised in light of climate mitigation, these questions seem equally applicable to adaptation.  
 Who might bring a claim relating to climate adaptation obligations, and against what 
countries? As adaptation obligations are arguably of erga omnes character, any state may invoke, 
on behalf of the international community, the responsibility of states failing to fulfill their 
national obligations to adapt, or of those failing to cooperate in facilitating international 
adaptation. Even if adaptation obligations are not of erga omnes character, states may invoke the 
responsibility of states in some situations. For instance, failing to adapt may entail negative 
transboundary consequences, such as destabilizing transboundary climate migration or increasing 
regional food insecurity. Failures to cooperate in facilitating international adaptation might 
contribute to maladaptation that redistributes vulnerability and magnifies risks across borders. As 
the World Adaptation Science Programme notes, “A territorial approach to adaptation–far from 
serving the national interest–is likely to heighten a country’s vulnerability to climate risk, as well 
as raise the risk exposure of their closest neighbours and allies”. 280 
By what standard could a state be judged as failing to fulfill national obligations to adapt 
to climate change, or to generally cooperate to facilitate adaptation internationally? Climate 
adaptation law is still developing, and climate treaties refer to adaptation with qualifiers and 
relatively imprecise language, providing states with discretion regarding adaptation measures. 
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This relatively lower level of precision contributes to a lack of apparent standards by which to 
judge a state as failing to fulfill its obligations. Failure to engage with adaptation at all would 
constitute a violation of states’ adaptation obligations, and this minimum threshold might be 
raised further by additional legal considerations. For instance, human rights considerations may 
support invoking the responsibility of states where failures to fulfill adaptation obligations lead 
to foreseeable violations of minimum human rights standards. Similarly, maladaptation derived 
in part from failures to cooperate in facilitating international adaptation could entail negative 
transboundary consequences, which would violate the prohibition on transboundary harm under 
general environmental law.281 As the adaptation regime develops and legal scholars explore its 
character and implications, the regime’s standards may become more defined. 
What is the likelihood of such a claim, and what might be the implications of bringing 
one for the climate change regime and international relations more generally? The LOSC’s 
binding dispute settlement mechanism may provide for compulsory procedures otherwise absent 
from the UNFCCC. As such, the LOSC’s applicability to violations of adaptation obligations 
involving oceans governance issues may expand the possibilities for climate litigation in 
international courts and tribunals. Climate change-related litigation to date has not been generally 
successful, but it must be noted that these cases have overwhelmingly focused on the mitigation 
regime.282 Expanding the scope of climate litigation to consider adaptation obligations may be 
significant to vulnerable states, including small island developing states, seeking to compel 
action regarding a significant environmental threat. Vanuatu, for instance, has already indicated 
plans to bring a case against the United States and Australia on mitigation grounds.283 Bodansky 
has noted that international climate litigation has traditionally risked distracting from or 
interfering with critical climate change negotiations, but opinions from legal fora could now 
stand to forward negotiations and shape normative expectations relating to climate change.284   
An additional, important consideration is whether vulnerable coastal states could use the 
LOSC dispute settlement mechanism to seek financial support for adaptation or redress for 
climate losses and damages from industrialized states. Indeed, financial support is a component 
 
281 See Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 241-242 [29]; see also Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case, p. 41 [53]. 
282 See Peel, Jacqueline, & Osofsky, Hari M. (2020). Climate Change Litigation. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 
16(1), pp. 21–38.  
283 Stephens, Tim (2019), Low-Lying Pacific Islands Sue Over Climate Change, The Lowy Interpreter. 
284 See Bodansky, Daniel. (2017). The Role of the International Court of Justice in Addressing Climate Change: Some 
Preliminary Reflections. Arizona State Law Journal, 49, pp. 709-712. 
 52 
of states’ cooperative adaptation obligations. Article 9(1) of the Paris Agreement obliges 
developed states parties to provide financial support as adaptation assistance to developing 
states.285 Similarly, Article 8 codifies a loss and damage mechanism applicable to slow onset 
events (such as sea-level rise) as well as to increasing the resilience of communities and 
ecosystems.286 However, this financial duty is generally a collective one owed by the 
international community—developed states more specifically—to developing states struggling 
with climate impacts. Developed states’ financial contributions appear discretionary, and climate 
law does not require individual states to provide specified levels of funding, though states would 
likely violate cooperative adaptation obligations by failing to provide any funding at all.  
States parties are instructed to communicate their financial commitments to the 
international community. These contributions are nonbinding, and failing to achieve them does 
not constitute a violation of the Paris Agreement. However, they could arguably be used to assess 
whether a state is violating its obligation to cooperate in facilitating international adaptation. As 
Broburg argues, states’ adaptation obligations under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement may 
instill legal responsibility for states considering the articles on loss and damages.287 Accordingly, 
vulnerable states might have standing to seek loss and damage claims outside of the Paris 
Agreement’s legal framework, such as via the LOSC’s dispute settlement mechanism.288  
Judicial awards and rulings may further the evolution of the LOSC in response to climate 
change, but courts and tribunals may also contribute to the development of the regime through 
the advisory opinion mechanism. While the topic is not explicitly addressed in the LOSC, ITLOS 
has found itself with the jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions, which its rules indicate may 
involve legal questions requested under compatible international agreements.289 Through 
advisory opinions, the tribunal has pronounced on environmental principles important to the 
protection of the marine environment, and though technically non-binding, such opinions can 
carry significant legal weight regarding the interpretation and application of treaties.290 In the 
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context of climate change, a group of states or an international organization addressing ocean 
issues might adopt an agreement requesting that ITLOS provide an advisory opinion relating to 
the interpretation and application of the LOSC regarding adaptation needs. 
 The issuance of an advisory opinion may further the LOSC’s development on several 
grounds. Advisory opinions have more general effects than judgments or awards specific to 
bilateral disputes, and they provide for additional states to have their voices heard. Furthermore, 
they can address issues at a high level of generality, allowing bilateral negotiations to settle 
specifics. They also allow courts to dodge issues of standing and causation, which often 
constitute major hurdles to climate litigation.291 A dispute need not be lodged under the LOSC 
for courts and tribunals to provide guidance reinterpreting the convention regarding climate 
change and related obligations. And in providing that advisory opinion, Article 293 would have 
ITLOS apply not only the convention text but also “other rules of international law,” which 
would include adaptation obligations under international climate law.292  
 The potential applicability of an ITLOS advisory opinion relating to adaptation needs on 
ocean governance issues may have significant practical implications. For instance, Vanuatu and 
other developing island states have explored requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ on 
climate change, but they have struggled to secure the support for a requisite UN General 
Assembly resolution.293 The possibility of an advisory opinion from ITLOS may offer an 
alternate and perhaps less onerous option than attempting to seek one from the ICJ. For instance, 
an agreement between vulnerable states relating to climate change and the ocean may constitute 
a body able and authorized to request an advisory opinion from ITLOS. This would require 
significantly less support than a UN General Assembly resolution requesting an ICJ advisory 
opinion. Through such a request, an advisory opinion could provide critical legal guidance for 
interpreting and applying the LOSC considering climate law. Furthermore, LOSC Article 293 
indicates that adaptation obligations may be considered law applicable to such guidance.294 
Conclusion 
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 As discussed in Chapter I, Climate change and related rules and norms are significant to 
international law, including the law of the sea. Climate impacts on coastal communities and the 
oceans are significant, increasingly seen as inevitable, and leading to legal issues for which the 
LOSC provides little clear guidance. Accordingly, a pertinent aspect of climate law is the 
adaptation regime, the purpose of which is to increase the resiliency and reduce the vulnerability 
of human and ecological systems to climate impacts. Chapter II finds this regime, entailing 
imprecise but binding obligations for states to adapt to climate change and to generally cooperate 
in facilitating international adaptation, is legal development relevant to the LOSC. Other scholars 
may contest this thesis’s position on the adaptation regime’s binding nature, but this regime is 
still developing and has already evolved significantly since the UNFCCC entered force.  
 The LOSC has a variety of mechanisms, analyzed in Chapter III, that facilitate its 
evolution in response to international legal developments. Not all these mechanisms are equally 
suited to addressing climate change, however. Climate impacts are continuously manifesting, 
universal, transboundary, and entail both environmental and sociopolitical consequences. 
Considering practical necessity and lex ferenda, climate adaptation must be considered 
systematically throughout the convention. Systematic interpretation of the LOSC considering 
climate adaptation rules may provide an evolutionary pathway through which the convention 
may harmonize with the adaptation regime.  
 Interpretation in this manner may provide a framework through which the LOSC may 
address existing and emerging climate change-related legal issues. As indicated in Chapter IV, 
consideration of adaptation obligations may inform the interpretation and application of LOSC 
articles regarding baselines and islands, states’ rights and duties in maritime zones, duties to the 
marine environment, scientific cooperation, and dispute settlement. Furthermore, that adaptation 
obligations may be applicable law for the LOSC’s dispute settlement mechanism has practical 
implications for the LOSC’s development. Adaptation obligations’ arguably erga omnes 
character might permit any state to invoke the responsibility of another state failing to fulfill 
them, thereby facilitating the ability of courts and tribunals to more easily issue judgments or 
awards that might contribute to the LOSC’s continued evolution regarding climate change. 
Furthermore, adaptation obligations’ applicability to the dispute settlement mechanism may ease 
vulnerable states’ ability to seek advisory opinions from ITLOS regarding climate change-related 
issues, and ITLOS must arguably apply adaptation obligations in doing so.  
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This thesis finds developing adaptation obligations legally significant to the law of the 
sea, potentially more so than the mitigation regime despite their relatively lower level of 
precision. These obligations may inform the systematic interpretation of the LOSC, and its 
applicability as law under the dispute settlement mechanism may provide practical opportunities 
for states to address disputes or to seek guidance regarding climate change-related legal issues. 
The adaptation regime’s legal significance will be further clarified as climate law continues to 
develop and as scholars continue to explore climate law’s applicability to the law of the sea. For 
instance, scholars might explore the relationship of climate law with instruments and institutions 
under the law of the sea that were beyond the scope of this thesis to assess.295 Systematic 
interpretation is unlikely to address all climate change-related legal issues in the law of the sea; 
however, systemic integration and harmonization of the LOSC with the climate adaptation 
regime may have the practical effect of promoting the LOSC’s own ability to adapt to climate 
change. In this way, harmonization with the adaptation regime might help the law of the sea to 
itself adapt to climate change.  
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